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COMMENT

Controlling Government Secrecy: A Judicial
Solution to the Internal and External
Conflicts Surrounding the State Secrets
Privilege
ELIZABETH ROSE BLAZEY†
“What ought to be done under such circumstances presents a
delicate question, the discussion of which, it is hoped, will never
be rendered necessary in this country.”1
Chief Justice John Marshall, 1807

SECRETS AND SPIES:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
John and Jane Doe were foreign nationals from an
enemy country.2 John was a highranking diplomat for that
country.3 After the couple expressed interest in defecting to
the United States, Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”)
“agents persuaded them to remain at their posts and
† J.D. Candidate, Class of 2011, University at Buffalo School of Law; M.B.A.
Candidate, Class of 2011, University at Buffalo School of Management; M.S.,
2006, California University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 2003, New York University. I
would like to extend many thanks to Professor Mateo TaussigRubbo for his
guidance throughout the research and writing process, and to Joshua Pennel for
his constant support and encouragement.
1. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d)
(Marshall, C.J.) (noting the quandary presented when disclosure of documents is
material to the defendant in a capital case but the secrecy of the documents is
necessary for national security).
2. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 3 (2005).
3. Id.
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conduct
espionage
for
the
United
States
. . . promising in return that the [g]overnment ‘would
arrange for travel to the United States and ensure financial
and personal security for life.’”4 “After ‘carrying out their
end of the bargain’ by completing years of purportedly high
risk, valuable espionage services . . . [John and Jane]
defected (under new names and false backgrounds) and
became United States citizens, with the [g]overnment’s
help.”5
After several years in the United States, John was laid
off and unable to find employment due to CIA restrictions.6
When the CIA refused to give further financial assistance,
the couple sued CIA director George Tenet, claiming “that
the CIA violated their procedural and substantive due
process rights by denying them support and by failing to
provide them with a fair internal process for reviewing their
claims.”7 John and Jane could not support themselves
within the United States; they could clearly not return to
their home country after defecting as United States spies.
The couple, however, found the highest court in the land
powerless to hear their dispute. Indeed, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in Tenet
v. Doe, held that “[p]ublic policy forbids the maintenance of
any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law
itself regards as confidential.”8 As Rehnquist explained, the
CIA, as an executive branch agency, has a legally
recognized privilege to withhold information that may bear
on national security.9 Additionally, Supreme Court
4. Id. at 34.
5. Id. at 4. “This provision allows a limited number of aliens and members of
their immediate families per year to be admitted to the United States for
permanent residence, regardless of their admissibility under the immigration
laws, upon a determination by the Director of the CIA, the Attorney General,
and the Commissioner of Immigration that admission of the particular alien ‘is
in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national
intelligence mission.’” Id. at n.2 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403h (2000)).
6. Id. at 45.
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id. at 8 (emphasis in original) (quoting Totten v. United States, 92 U.S.
105, 107 (1875)).
9. Id. at 8, 1011.
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precedent from Totten v. United States recognizes that
contracts for espionage services qualify categorically as
national security information.10 Therefore, John and Jane
Doe were barred entirely from any legal remedy in United
States courts because the validity of their claim rested on
state secrets.
The state secrets claim, once invoked by the
government, is “‘absolute’ and ‘cannot be compromised by
any showing of need on the part of the party seeking the
information.’”11
A. Conflicts Arising from a Claim of Privilege
If the government formally claims the state secrets
privilege and that claim is accepted by the courts, no
individual right can overcome the claim.12 The courts do not
apply a balancing test of individual right against the need
for secretkeeping; rather, they preclude the “secret”
information outright.13 Therefore, the privilege often has the
effect of removing key evidence from a trial, making it
impossible for the plaintiff to meet his burden of proof or for
the defendant to present a defense. On the other hand, the
privilege protects sensitive information that may
substantially impact foreign policy relationships, national
security, and military secrets.
The use of the privilege has become contentious and
highly politicized over the past decade as politicians,
scholars and the media have disagreed over the answers to
fundamental questions about the separation of powers
10. Totten, 92 U.S. at 10607 (1875). “[A]s a general principle . . . public policy
forbids the maintenance of any suit . . . the trial of which would inevitably lead
to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential . . . . On
this principle, suits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of
the confidences of the confessional, or those between husband and wife, or of
communications by a client to his counsel for professional advice, or of a patient
to his physician for a similar purpose. Much greater reason exists for the
application of the principle to cases of contract for secret services with the
government, as the existence of a contract of that kind is itself a fact not to be
disclosed.” Id. at 107.
11. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Northrop
Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
12. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
13. See id.
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doctrine,
constitutional
law,
and
government
competencies.14 Indeed, the privilege presents legal and
political conflicts both within the government (internal) and
between the government and other stakeholders (external).
Internal conflict stems from the lack of clarity about the
separation of powers. It remains undecided which branch or
branches of the government have the right to define and
control the privilege. External conflict stems from the
impact that state secrets decisions may have on relations
between the government and stakeholders outside the
government, especially including other governments and
private businesses. This Comment explores these internal
and external conflicts in order to determine who should
define and control the privilege.
B. Internal Conflict
First, this Comment explores internal conflict using
legal and historical traditions as a framework to determine
which branch or branches of the government have the
legitimate power and competency to define and control the
state secrets privilege. The current democratic majority in
Congress views the privilege as a common law rule of
evidence, malleable to legislation.15 To prove its point, both
houses have introduced legislation to define and control the
privilege, with the goal of removing decisionmaking power
from the hands of the executive by requiring judicial
oversight and review in all cases.16 The Obama
administration opposes these bills; indeed, it has aligned
itself with past administrations by arguing that the
privilege falls under the foundational powers given
14. See, e.g., Editorial, Shady Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at A38;
Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, On the Administration’s Policy on the Use of
the State Secrets Privilege (Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Leahy Press Release],
available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=15ad5024
c50c4ef38088578dde09981d; see also State Secret Protection Act of 2009, H.R.
984, 111th Cong. (2009); State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong.
(2009); LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 16569 (2006); ROBERT
M. PALLITTO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW 9394
(2007).
15. See Adam Liptak, Obama Administration Weighs in on State Secrets,
Raising Concern on the Left, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4. 2009, at A11 (“If the privilege is
an ordinary commonlaw rule of evidence, Congress is probably free to alter it.”).
16. H.R. 984; S. 417.
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exclusively to the executive through Article II of the
Constitution.17 The judiciary recognizes a qualified
constitutional privilege for the executive subject to judicial
review under certain circumstances.18 The circumstances for
such review depend on the type of information at issue. For
instance, the courts accord great deference to the executive
for military and foreign relations secrets,19 while the courts
treat disclosure for other types of secrets under statutory
guidelines set by Congress.20
A careful analysis reveals that the congressional
approach would impermissibly broaden the disclosure of
secrets. The executive approach remains too protective of
17. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 2832, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, No. 08678 (U.S. July 13, 2009)
[hereinafter Mohawk Brief] (“[P]rivileges such as those protecting Presidential
communications and state secrets qualify for [immediate appealability under
the collateral order doctrine] in light of their structural constitutional grounding
under the separation of powers, relatively rare invocation, and unique
importance to governmental functions.”); Memorandum from Constitutional &
Specialized Torts Staff, Civil Div., Torts Branch, U.S. Dep’t of Justice on
Personal Liability Claims Arising out of National Security Operations, 3 (Dec.
2008) [hereinafter National Security Operations Memorandum] (on file with
Buffalo Law Review) (“The state secrets privilege is based on the President’s
Article II power to conduct foreign affairs and to provide for the national
defense, and therefore has constitutional underpinnings.”).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (asserting review of
privileged executive communications where due process requires those
communications be submitted as evidence); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,
Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 944 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2010) (“While the court should ‘defer to the [e]xecutive on matters of foreign
policy and national security’ in making this determination, ‘[j]udicial control
over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive
officers.”) (internal citations omitted) (quoting AlHaramain Islamic Found., Inc.
v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 910 (1953)).
19. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 3 (2005); Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
20. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telcomms. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp.
2d 1109, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that FISA preempts the state secrets
privilege); see also Liptak, supra note 15 (“The judge in San Francisco . . . ruled
that Congress had indeed overridden the state secrets privilege when it enacted
[FISA]. The judge said that by setting up a secret court to consider requests for
intelligence surveillance, and by setting up other domestic regulations of foreign
intelligence surveillance, ‘Congress intended for the executive branch to
relinquish its neartotal control over whether the fact of unlawful surveillance
could be protected as a secret.’”).
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purported secrets. The independent approach by the
judiciary appropriately weighs the situational nuances that
such decision making requires. Therefore, the position of
the judiciary should, as it has in the past, remain the rule.
C. External Conflict
The second part of this Comment uses extraordinary
rendition cases to discuss the potential impact of United
States secretkeeping on foreign relations, and how this
impact may affect the decision about which branch of
government should define and control the privilege.
Extraordinary rendition involves the detention in the
United States of an alien labeled as an “enemy combatant”
and the subsequent transportation of that alien to a foreign
country.21 Former detainee allegations have raised the
hackles of scholars, the media, and the public (and therefore
politicians) because of claims that the extraordinary
rendition program relies on illegal detention, harsh
interrogations and even torture.22 No claims raised against
the government by former victims of extraordinary
rendition have succeeded, in part because of the state
secrets privilege.
After discussing what the extraordinary rendition cases
tell us about the nature of the privilege, this paper
concludes that the extraordinary rendition cases strengthen
the position that the executive branch should control and
define the state secrets privilege, with limited oversight by
the judiciary.
I. THE MODERN DEBATE: WHO ARE THE SECRETKEEPERS?
It seems a foregone conclusion that the government
must keep secrets.23 Although we look to the rights of the
21. See Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 107375; Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d
559, 564 n.1 (2d. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); ElMasri v.
United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007).
22. See infra pp. 4142 and note 187.
23. See PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 14, at 9394. Although critical of the
state secrets privilege, the authors admit that “[w]hile judges occasionally
ground the privilege in the separation of powers, the ultimate reason to uphold
its use is on the practical grounds that it is necessary for the survival of the
state. . . . Sometimes it is characterized as preconstitutional, even prelegal,
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individual to frame many of our legal procedures,24 our laws,
and, arguably, our very notion of sovereignty, we remain
staunchly utilitarian when framing the issue of our national
security.
We often place national security issues on par with
notions of basic nationhood and survival.25 Indeed, as in the
case of John and Jane Doe discussed above,26 we seem
willing to overlook actual wrongs perpetrated against
individuals in order to guard against potential harm to
national security. After all, “we the people” do not want our
economic, engineering, and atomic secrets to fall into the
wrong hands. However, we are not a unified entity but a
country of 300 million individuals. Secrecy requires
exclusion. If all individuals had access to all information, we
would not have any secrets. Some secrecy, however, remains
necessary to accomplish various public policy objectives.27
Therefore, we have entrusted the government to fill the role
of secretkeeper. However, like the citizenry, the
government is not a unified entity. Rather, the government
stands on a foundation of internal conflict designed to
balance power by breaking the whole into multiple parts,
each holding only a fraction of power. And these parts all
fight like hell to hang onto—and increase—their turf.
and arises from the raw fact that countries have a responsibility to prevent
becoming instruments in their own destruction.” Id.
24. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. IVVII (Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; Fifth Amendment protection against
double jeopardy, right against self incrimination, and right to due process of
law; Sixth Amendment rights to speedy trial and impartial jury, right to notice,
right to cross examine witnesses, and right to counsel; Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)
(rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness).
25. See United States v. CurtissWright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)
(“The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to
maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been
mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as
necessary concomitants of nationality.”); see also PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra
note 14, at 94 (“Justice Sutherland noted in 1936 that the power to ensure
national survival is not one granted by the Constitution but is a ‘necessary
concomitant of nationality.’” (quoting CurtissWright, 299 U.S. at 318)).
26. See supra pp. 12.
27. For example, in order to protect witnesses in certain criminal cases, we
may protect the witnesses’ identity and location from the public with a witness
protection program.
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Therefore, it is no surprise that the three branches of
government disagree about which branch has the power to
control secretkeeping under the privilege. Indeed, “[a]t the
root of the issue over the state secrets privilege are
contested views about the limits of judicial review of
administrative actions and about intrusions by judges into
the complex worlds of intelligence gathering and analysis
and law enforcement.”28
Despite the recent controversy surrounding it, the state
secrets privilege sat squarely in the executive camp for most
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Since the time of
President Lincoln, the executive branch has controlled the
privilege, nurturing it as it grew to become a deeply rooted
principle of modern federal practice. Certain events in
history helped solidify use of the privilege. Indeed, the
“habits of secrecy which took hold during World War II and
the administrative mythology connected with the ‘secret’ of
the atomic bomb are partly responsible for the hideand
seek atmosphere in the [f]ederal executive branch today.”29
However, in the first eight years of the twentyfirst
century, during the presidency of George W. Bush,
controversy surrounded the privilege as it collided with
congressional acts like the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (“FISA”),30 the Classified Information Procedures Act
(“CIPA”),31 and the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).32
The media and legal scholars derided the privilege as a
means for unchecked abuse, adding yet another issue to the
litany of controversy undermining the Bush administration.
In January 2008, responding to “a strong public
perception” that the privilege is “a tool for [e]xecutive
abuse”33 and facing off against a weakened President Bush,34
28. PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 14, at 88.
29. RICHARD P. LONGAKER, THE PRESIDENCY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 17576
(1961).
30. 50 U.S.C. §§ 180163 (2000).
31. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 116 (2000).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
33. S. REP. NO. 110442, at 3 (2008); see also Carrie Newton Lyons, The State
Secrets Privilege: Expanding its Scope Through Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 99, 11112 (2007).
34. See Marjorie Connelly, New Bush, Iraq Poll Numbers, THE CAUCUS (Mar.
1, 2007, 6:40 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/03/01/newbush
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a newlydemocratic Congress attempted to seize power from
the unwieldy Executive by introducing S2253, a bill
sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy called the State
Secrets Protection Act. This bill defined the state secrets
privilege as a rule of evidence, placing parameters on
executive use, and guiding courts in their applications. The
Senate Judiciary Committee made a full report on
S2253, clearly laying out the views of the majority and
minority on the origins of the privilege and the appropriate
role of Congress.35 In this report, the majority argues that
the privilege has common law roots.36 Although the bill died
at the end of the 110th Congress,37 it was reintroduced to
the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 11, 2009,
during the 111th Congress, as S417, where it must again
undergo the committee reporting process in order to move
forward.38
In March 2008, the House of Representatives
introduced its own State Secrets Protections Act39 which,
like the Senate bill, died at the end of the 110th Congress,
and was resurrected by the 111th.40 This bill will likely die
with the expiration of the 111th Congress and may or may
not receive a new life in 20112012. The House and Senate
bills each contain requirements that would compel a judge
to review all secret material before allowing a state secrets
privilege claim.41 Two of the original cosponsors of the
Senate bill, Senators Hillary Clinton and Joseph Biden, now
iraqpollnumbers/; Kenneth T. Walsh, President Bush’s Poll Numbers Are
Going From Bad to Worse, POL. & POL’Y NEWS DESK (Apr. 11, 2008),
http://politics.usnews.com/news/blogs/newsdesk/2008/04/11/presidentbushs
pollnumbersaregoingfrombadtoworse.html.
35. S. REP. NO. 110442 (2008); see also S. 2253, 110th Cong. (2008).
36. S. REP. NO. 110442, at 68.
37. See S. 2253: State Secrets Protection Act, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s1102533 (last visited Sept. 19,
2010) (“Sessions of Congress last two years, and at the end of each session all
proposed bills and resolutions that haven’t passed are cleared from the books.
Members often reintroduce bills that did not come up for debate under a new
number in the next session.”).
38. S. 417, 111th Cong. (2009).
39. State Secret Protection Act of 2008, H.R. 5607, 110th Cong. (2008).
40. State Secret Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984, 111th Cong. (2009).
41. H.R. 984, at 4; H.R. 5607, at 4.
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serve under President Obama in the executive branch as
Secretary of State and Vice President, respectively. After
the bill was reintroduced, the Obama administration filed
an amicus brief with the Supreme Court for Mohawk
Industries v. Carpenter,42 arguing on a point tangent to the
case that the state secrets privilege has a constitutional
foundation.43 This argument stands contrary to the
congressional claim that the privilege is merely a common
law rule of evidence.
Both Congress and the executive branch each believe it
alone has the power to define and control the state secrets
privilege. However, each recognizes the constitutional
ambiguity of the privilege and looks to the Supreme Court
to buttress their arguments. The Court, however, has not
addressed the privilege directly since United States v.
Reynolds in 1953; and, in Reynolds, the Court did not clarify
the origins and nature of the privilege. 44
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case of
Mohawk Industries on October 5, 2009, during which the
government spoke on the issue of state secrets privileges.45
In essence, the government argued that the privilege forms
a function of “constitutional significance.”46 Chief Justice
Roberts indirectly acknowledged the government position.47
The privilege, however, was not a central issue in Mohawk
Industries. Indeed, the Court avoided the issue in its
opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote, in a footnote:
“Participating as amicus curiae . . . the United States
contends that . . . appeals should be available for rulings
involving certain governmental privileges ‘in light of their
structural constitutional grounding under the separation of
powers, relatively rare invocation, and unique importance to

42. Mohawk Brief, supra note 17.
43. Id. at 2832.
44. 345 U.S. 1 (1952).
45. Transcript of Oral Argument at 2425, 43, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v.
Carpenter, No. 08678 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2009).
46. Id. at 42.
47. Id. at 4243 (“CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So you are saying that you—
government lawyers cannot seek an interlocutory appeal of any privilege
claimed, other than presidential communications and [s]tate secrets?”).
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governmental functions’ . . . We express no view on that
issue.”48
On September 23, 2009, several months before the
Court released its decision in Mohawk Industries, the
Obama administration created a new state secrets policy
initiative to appease Congress and the public.49 President
Obama had made pledges during his presidential
campaign50 and during his first year of office51 to limit the
privilege. The new policy requires all state secrets privilege
claims to be submitted to the Department of Justice,
recommended by the Assistant Attorney General and by a
State Secrets Review Committee, and approved by the
Attorney General before the privilege can be claimed in
court.52 In addition, the policy delineates criteria that must
be used to evaluate the claim of privilege and the
evidentiary support necessary for the Department of Justice

48. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, No. 08678, slip op. at 12 n.4 (U.S. Dec.
8, 2009).
49. See Memorandum from the Att’y Gen. to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts &
Agencies & the Heads of Dep’t Components on Policies and Procedures
Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege 13 (Sept. 23, 2009)
[hereinafter
State
Secrets
Privilege
Memorandum],
available
at
www.justice.gov/opa/documents/statesecretprivileges.pdf.
50. See Liptak, supra note 15.
51. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Nat’l Archives &
Records Admin. 8 (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
presdocs/2009/DCPD200900388.pdf (“[M]y administration is also confronting
challenges to what is known as the state secrets privilege. This is a doctrine
that allows the [g]overnment to challenge legal cases involving secret programs.
. . . [W]hile this principle is absolutely necessary in some circumstances to
protect national security, I am concerned that it has been overused. It is also
currently the subject of a wide range of lawsuits. So let me lay out some
principles here. We must not protect information merely because it reveals the
violation of a law or embarrassment to the [g]overnment. And that’s why my
administration is nearing completion of a thorough review of this practice. And
we plan to embrace several principles for reform. We will apply a stricter legal
test to material that can be protected under the state secrets privilege. We will
not assert the privilege in court without first following our own formal process,
including review by a Justice Department committee and the personal approval
of the Attorney General. And each year, we will voluntarily report to Congress
when we have invoked the privilege . . . because, as I said before, there must be
proper oversight over our actions.”).
52. See State Secrets Privilege Memorandum, supra note 49, at 13.
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to consider such a claim.53 In response to the new policy,
Senator Patrick Leahy, sponsor of the State Secrets
Protection Act, stated he was “pleased that the Attorney
General is moving in the right direction[,]” but remains
“especially concerned with ensuring that the government
make a substantial evidentiary showing to a federal judge
in asserting the privilege.”54 Senator Leahy gave no
indication that the new policy lessened the need for a
congressional act defining and controlling the privilege.55
Indeed, despite the new policy, neither the Senate nor
the House has killed the pending state secrets legislation.56
The privilege remains hotly contested in both houses. Such
contention, however, is not new. Debate on the ability of the
government to withhold evidence under a claim of secrecy
has continued for over two centuries, often couched in
gripping tales of espionage, treason, and torture. Most
recently, the government filed a memorandum in the
District Court for the District of Columbia arguing that the
state secrets privilege bars a claim by a plaintiff seeking an
injunction to stop the government from targeting a known
terrorist with an alleged CIA assassination program.57
Despite these two centuries of debate, the government has
carefully avoided a direct answer to the question: “Who are
the secretkeepers?” Therefore, this country has never fully
dealt with the origins, meaning, and implications of the
privilege. To understand why this issue has come to a head
at this particular time and what path to take from here, we
must understand the historical context of the debate.
A. The “Treason” of Aaron Burr
In 1807, before a grand jury was convened to indict him
for treason, Aaron Burr sought a subpoena to order the
53. See id. at 12.
54. Leahy Press Release, supra note 14.
55. Id.
56. This statement remains accurate as of the publishing of this Comment in
the fall of 2010.
57. Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction &
Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 5354, AlAulaqi
v. Obama, No. 10cv1469JDB (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010) (arguing that the
information sought could disclose national security secrets about how anti
terrorist operations do or do not work).
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disclosure of letters written between President Thomas
Jefferson and General James Wilkinson about his alleged
treason.58 President Jefferson discussed the letters sought
by Burr in a special message to Congress delivered on
January 22, 1807, stating: “The mass of what I have
received . . . is voluminous . . . . In this state of the evidence,
delivered . . . under the restriction of private confidence,
neither safety nor justice will permit the exposing names,
except that of the principal actor, whose guilt is placed
beyond question.”59 The drama of Burr’s treason trial
gripped the country and provided a key test for the new
Constitution. The Court eventually acquitted Burr after the
prosecution could not present two witnesses as required by
the Constitution.60 However, Justice Marshall’s discussion of
the Wilkinson letters provides a foundation for the state
secrets debate.
Anticipating the subpoena for letters written from
Wilkinson to President Jefferson, the government
prosecutors argued that the letters could not be turned over
because they contained “matter which ought not to be
disclosed.”61 Chief Justice Marshall did not address this
objection directly, instead ordering that the issue be
discussed after the return of the subpoena. He left open the
possibility that material may be suppressed if that material
is necessary to national security and is not material to the
defense. Indeed, Marshall wrote:
58. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,692d). Wilkinson, a Commander in the Army, purported to have conspired
with Burr in a plan to seize the Spanish territory of Mexico, break the West
from the rest of the country, and create a new Western empire with Burr as the
leader. Sensing personal gain, Wilkinson betrayed Burr’s plans to President
Jefferson, who passively waited nearly a year before issuing an arrest warrant
for Burr in 1807. Historians have since determined that Wilkinson was a paid
double agent of Spain. See ANDRO LINKLATER, AN ARTIST IN TREASON: THE
EXTRAORDINARY DOUBLE LIFE OF GENERAL JAMES WILKINSON 16 (2009).
59. President Thomas Jefferson, Special Message to Congress on the Burr
Conspiracy, (Jan. 22, 1807), available at http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/
speeches/detail/3497.
60. See Frederic Jesup Stimson, Lowell Institute Lecture on English Liberty
and the Freedom of Labor at Boston (Oct.Nov. 1907), in THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 63, 89 (1908); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt
act, or on confession in open court.”).
61. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37.
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There is certainly nothing before the court which shows that the
letter in question contains any matter the disclosure of which
would endanger the public safety . . . . If it does contain any
matter which it would be imprudent to disclose, which it is not the
wish of the [E]xecutive to disclose, such matter, if it be not
immediately and essentially applicable to the point, will, of
course, be suppressed.62

Burr also requested a subpoena for letters written by
President Jefferson to Wilkinson, allegedly communicating
the political situation between the United States and Spain.
To this request, Marshall wrote: “If it contain [sic] matter
not essential to the defence [sic], and the disclosure be
unpleasant to the [E]xecutive, it certainly ought not to be
disclosed.”63 However, he again stated that this
determination would be made upon the return, not the
issuance, of the subpoena.64 Marshall never discussed what
would happen if the material which “ought not to be
disclosed” were material to the defense.
Several courts have cited Burr as standing for the
validity of executive branch control of state secrets.65 The
executive branch has, likewise, cited Burr to justify its
assertion that “[t]he necessity of permitting the [e]xecutive
[b]ranch to protect military, intelligence, and diplomatic
secrets from disclosure has been recognized since the
earliest days of the Republic.”66 However, at least one
author argues that Burr does not stand for the proposition
that a president can withhold information at his or her
discretion; indeed, the Burr case leaves open the question of
whether the decision to withhold sensitive national security
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 47475 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he
privilege in this country has its initial roots in Aaron Burr’s trial for treason
. . . .”); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 70 (D.D.C. 2004)
(“The origins of the state secrets privilege can be traced back to the treason trial
of Aaron Burr . . . .”); Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 483 (E.D. Mich. 1977)
(“Although the origins of the military or state secrets privilege can be traced as
far back as Aaron Burr’s trial in 1807, the seminal decision of the Supreme
Court on this privilege is United States v. Reynolds.”) (internal citation omitted).
66. National Security Operations Memorandum, supra note 17, at 3; see also
id. at 212 (discussing the potential for asserting the state secrets privilege).
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information should be made by a judge or by the executive.67
Likewise, the members of the United States Senate
opposing the State Secrets Protection Act argue that Burr
provides an example dating to the earliest days of the
Republic where the courts were faced with the question of
“whether a court may constitutionally force the [e]xecutive
[b]ranch to disclose secret information.”68 However, the
Senate report does not explain whether Burr is understood
to confine state secret decisionmaking power to the courts
or to the executive branch.69
Indeed, a determination of the locus of state secrets
control cannot come from Burr alone because Burr did not
clearly address whether the roots of the privilege stem from
the Constitution, from the common law, or from a
combination of the two. The power of the privilege itself
rests on such a distinction. Marshall refused to address the
question. Instead, he explained that the seeming conflict
between the right of the accused to see information material
to his defense and the necessity of secrecy for the sake of
national security “presents a delicate question, the
discussion of which, it is hoped, will never be rendered
necessary in this country.”70
B.

A Fiery Plane Crash in Georgia

The question that Chief Justice Marshall hoped would
never be raised has only once been addressed directly by the
Supreme Court. In 1952, at the height of the McCarthy era,
the Court heard United States v. Reynolds,71 in which the
spouses of several United States service members brought
an action under the Tort Claims Act72 against the federal
government after a plane exploded over Georgia during a
military test of “secret electronic equipment,” killing nine of
the thirteen people aboard.73 Chief Justice Vinson wrote the
majority opinion for six members of the Court, creating a
67. See PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 14, at 95.
68. S. REP. NO. 110442, at 38 (2008).
69. See generally id.
70. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
71. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
72. Id. at 2 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674 (1952)).
73. Id. at 1, 3.
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fourpart test through which the head of an executive
agency could invoke the state secrets privilege: (1) “[t]here
must be a formal claim of privilege,” (2) “lodged by the head
of the department which has control over the matter,” (3)
“after actual personal consideration by that officer” and (4)
“[t]he court itself must determine whether the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and
yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the
privilege is designed to protect.”74
The Court likened the state secrets privilege to the Fifth
Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, reasoning
that “[t]oo much judicial inquiry . . . would force disclosure
of the thing the privilege was meant to protect, while a
complete abandonment of judicial control would lead to
intolerable abuses.”75 The Court reasoned that the Fifth
Amendment privilege developed with some advocates
claiming “the bare assertion by the witness must be taken
as conclusive, and others saying that the witness should be
required to reveal the matter behind his claim of privilege
to the judge for verification.”76 The Fifth Amendment right,
like the state secrets privilege, requires that “the court must
be satisfied from all the evidence and circumstances . . .
‘that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation
of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because
injurious disclosure could result.’”77 “If the court is so
satisfied . . . the privilege will be accepted without requiring
further disclosure.”78
The Fifth Amendment, however, is different from the
state secrets privilege in at least two material respects—it
is specifically mentioned in the Constitution and is
considered a “right” not a “privilege.” Government secret
keeping is not guided by plain language in the Constitution.
Furthermore, the term “privilege” indicates the presence of
some limiting or qualifying mechanism. The Court in
Reynolds did not note these distinctions.

74. Id. at 78.
75. Id. at 8.
76. Id. at 9.
77. Id. (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 487 (1951)).
78. Id.
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After setting forth the fourpart test, the Court refused
to give fixed parameters for the disclosure of information to
judges. Instead, it held that “[j]udicial control over the
evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of
executive officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say that the
court may automatically require a complete disclosure to
the judge . . . .”79 The Court also held that the interest of
military secrets will always overcome the interests of the
individual.80
Reynolds has been criticized harshly in recent years
because the information originally sought has been
declassified, and does not appear to contain the sensitive
national security secrets the government originally
claimed.81 Indeed, the declassified information seems to
reveal little more than potential negligence on the part of
the government.82 In response to the declassified
information, the daughter of one of the fallen servicemen
filed a suit in district court seeking a writ of coram nobis83 to
reverse Reynolds.84 The Supreme Court denied the writ in
this case;85 however, as information claimed under the state
secrets privilege in other cases becomes declassified with
time, courts may see more lawsuits seeking to reverse
“erroneous” decisions of courts in state secrets matters.

79. Id. at 910.
80. Id. at 11 (“Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of
privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity
cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that
military secrets are at stake.”).
81. See e.g., FISHER, supra note 14, at 16669; see also Herring v. United
States, No. 03CV5500LDD, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545, at *6, *1521 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 10, 2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005) (upholding the original
Reynolds decision despite new evidence that the state secrets privilege had been
inappropriately claimed).
82. See Herring, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545, at *21, *30 (alleging that the
declassified documents show negligence and do not contain military secrets).
83. FISHER, supra note 14, at 169 (“The writ of coram nobis, originating in
England, is a motion to a court to review and correct its judgment because it
was based on error of fact.”).
84. Herring, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545, at *6.
85. Id.
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Critics note that Reynolds largely patterns the
overruled English case Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co.,86
which allowed the British Crown to make conclusive
determinations about secrecy needs.87 However, this critique
remains unfounded, since Reynolds permits judicial review
of documents if necessary while Duncan does not. The fact
that courts can review secret information, however, does not
indicate their willingness to do so. One author critical of the
courts’ current role notes that in camera inspection is
required in less than onethird of U.S. cases, and, during
the “presidency of George H. W. Bush, the numbers
drop[ped] to below onequarter.”88 Arguably, however, if the
courts review information in onethird of cases, then the
courts may already be striking the balance articulated in
Reynolds.89 However, because of the Court’s refusal in
Reynolds to set a bright line rule for judicial review of secret
information, and the failure to classify the privilege as
either a common law rule or a constitutional power,
Reynolds provides fodder for both the executive and
legislative branches in the state secrets debate.
II. INTERNAL CONFLICTS: DISAGREEMENTS IN THE THREE
BRANCHES
A. The Executive Approach
The executive branch believes it has constitutional and
other authority giving it an absolute power to withhold
secret information from external actors and from the other
branches of government. For the United States government
to function, the executive branch must obey and enforce the
laws of Congress without being directly controlled by
Congress in its enforcement. Such a distinction remains
vital to the separation of powers upon which our
government relies. For instance, in 1958, President
Eisenhower refused to allow executive branch employees to
86. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] AC 624 (H.L.) 641 (appeal taken
from Eng.), overruled by Conway v. Rimmer [1968] AC 910 (H.L.). In overruling
Duncan, Conway held that the English Court had the power to override the
Crown’s assertion of privilege.
87. See, e.g., PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 14, at 102.
88. Id. at 105.
89. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 910 (1953).
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testify to Senate subcommittee members about certain
executive branch conversations.90 He wrote, “I direct this
action so as to maintain the proper separation of powers
between the executive and legislative branches . . . in
accordance with my responsibilities and duties under the
Constitution. This separation is vital to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary power by any branch of the
[g]overnment.”91 Indeed, the information used by the
executive branch to make internal decisions is not created
for or controlled by Congress.
Rather, the executive branch creates and controls its
own information. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution
states that the President “may require the [o]pinion, in
writing, of the principal [o]fficer in each of the executive
[d]epartments, upon any [s]ubject relating to the [d]uties of
their respective [o]ffices.”92 The Constitution does not give
this power to Congress. Several other presidential powers,
such as the power to make treaties, and the power to make
certain nominations, require the advice and consent of the
Senate; however, the requesting of information from
executive branch agencies is given to the Executive
exclusively. Although the President “shall from time to time
give to the Congress [i]nformation of the State of the
Union,” and “shall take [c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully
executed,”93 he is not required to collect and disseminate
information at the behest of Congress.
Even if the state secrets privilege lacks constitutional
roots, the President may draw secretkeeping powers from
other sources. Indeed, the Supreme Court reasoned in
United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp.94 that there
are clear differences between powers to conduct internal
affairs and powers to conduct external affairs.95
Although much of the CurtissWright discussion
centered on foreign affairs powers with respect to treaties, it
arguably contemplated other types of foreign agreements
90. LONGAKER, supra note 29, at 177.
91. Id. (internal citation omitted); see also id. at 17678.
92. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
93. Id. art. II, § 3.
94. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
95. Id. at 31516.
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and communications as well as internal executive
discussions of policy relating to foreign policy strategy. In
CurtissWright, the Court reasoned that external affairs
powers are not given by an affirmative grant of the
Constitution, because the Constitution contains powers
doled out by the states.96 The states never had the authority
to conduct external affairs; only the Union had this power.97
The states did not have to agree to this grant of power;
rather, the Executive already had the power stemming from
the Articles of Confederation.98 Therefore, in the context of
external affairs, “the President alone has the power to
speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”99
If the President’s capacity to make secret agreements
with other countries and to create secret policies governing
foreign affairs falls within the scope of CurtissWright, then
it may be outside the scope of power of the judiciary, who
manages internal legal affairs, or Congress, who serves as a
representative of the states under the Constitution, to
require that the President disclose secrets of foreign affairs.
The Obama administration, in its new state secrets
policy, has defined the state secrets privilege as necessary
only when it “protect[s] information the unauthorized
disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause
significant harm to the national defense or foreign relations
. . . of the United States.”100 By defining national security
issues as those specifically pertaining to “national defense
or foreign relations[,]” the policy draws support from
CurtissWright. Although the Court in CurtissWright
reasoned that the President’s foreign relations powers were
subordinate to certain provisions of the Constitution,101 it
96. Id. at 317.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 319.
100. State Secrets Privilege Memorandum, supra note 49, at 1.
101. CurtisWright, 299 U.S. at 31920 (“It is important to bear in mind that
we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an
exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations—a power which does not
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like
every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the
applicable provisions of the Constitution.”).
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also underscored the importance of presidential “discretion
and freedom” in foreign affairs that would not be allowable
in the context of domestic affairs alone.102
The Court discussed several sources of information that
the President alone has power to interpret.103 The nature of
this information may create the need for secrecy. “Secrecy in
respect of information gathered by [the President’s foreign
affairs sources] may be highly necessary, and the premature
disclosure of it productive of harmful results.”104 To support
this point, the Court cited the following statement by
President George Washington:
‘The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their
success must often depend on secrecy; and even when brought to a
conclusion a full disclosure . . . might have a pernicious influence
on future negotiations, or produce . . . danger and mischief, in
relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy
was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate . . . . To
admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand
. . . papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be
to establish a dangerous precedent.’105

Although CurtissWright specifically discussed secrecy
in the foreign relations context, the federal government
keeps secrets in many other areas. Indeed, the type of
secrecy discussed by Washington has been continuously
defined and redefined by the fortythree Presidents since
Washington, both in external and internal affairs contexts.
The secrecy of certain information and communication is
necessary to carry out executive duties. To this end, several
Presidents have signed executive orders codifying the
classification and dissemination of information.106
102. Id. at 320.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 32021 (quoting President George Washington, Reply to the House
of Representatives of the United States (Mar. 30, 1796), in 1 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 194, 19495 (James D.
Richardson, 1897)).
106. See William G. Phillips, The Government’s Classification System, in NONE
61, 6264 (Norman Dorsen
& Stephen Gillers eds., 1974). The modern classification system was first
established during World War I, modeled after British and French procedures to
OF YOUR BUSINESS: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN AMERICA
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In 1973, under President Nixon, a special committee led
by Assistant Attorney General and future Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court William H. Rehnquist107 finished more
than a year of work to create Executive Order 11652, which
modernized the classification system using the power vested
in the President by the Constitution and by statute.108 With
a touch of historical irony, President Nixon released the
following statement to accompany the order:
Unfortunately, the system of classification . . . has failed to meet
the standards of an open and democratic society, allowing too
many papers to be classified for too long a time . . . .
[C]lassification has frequently served to conceal bureaucratic
mistakes or to prevent embarrassment to officials and
apply to military information. Id. at 6263. In 1940, President Roosevelt’s
Executive Order 8381 became the first such order to regulate the classification
of nonmilitary information. Id. at 63. After World War II began, the Office of
War Information instituted a governmentwide classification system pursuant
to Executive Orders 9103 and 9182. Id. The National Security Act of 1947
codified the classification system; however, the military still used the 1940
order. Id. In 1950, President Truman issued Executive Order 10104, which
revised and updated the 1940 order as applied to military classification. Id. In
1951, after state secrets were published in national magazines during the
Korean War, President Truman signed Executive Order 10290 establishing
secrecy classifications for all nonmilitary information in the hands of the
federal government. LONGAKER, supra note 29, at 178 (discussing Exec. Order
No. 10,290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9795 (Sept. 27, 1951)). “The order extended to all
agencies the power to impose restrictions on the release of information which
had once been limited to the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic
Energy Commission.” Id. In 1953, President Eisenhower issued Executive Order
10501 to meet some criticisms of the classification system by limiting the power
of agency heads to delegate classification duties and clarifying the definition of
information that could be withheld from the public. Id. (discussing Exec. Order
No. 10,501, 18 Fed. Reg. 7049 (Nov. 10, 1953)). Despite criticism, the
Eisenhower system was kept, with few amendments, for nearly twenty years.
Phillips, supra, at 6364.
107. Rehnquist was an advocate for the executive branch viewpoint of the
state secrets privilege. He argued that the President had the power to withhold
state secret information. See generally Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum
from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice & John R.
Stevenson, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State on the President’s Executive Privilege
to Withhold Foreign Policy and National Security Information (Dec. 8, 1969)
[hereinafter Executive Privilege Memorandum] (on file with Buffalo Law
Review). Justice Rehnquist also wrote the opinion in Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1
(2005).
108. Phillips, supra note 106, at 62, 64.
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administrations . . . . [W]hen information which properly belongs
to the public is systematically withheld by those in power, the
people soon become ignorant of their own affairs, distrustful of
those who manage them, and—eventually—incapable of
determining their own destinies.109

Only one year later, Nixon was embroiled in his own
legal quagmire as he tried to exercise an executive privilege
to withhold information requested during a criminal
investigation into the Watergate scandal.110 In United States
v. Nixon, the Supreme Court remained ambiguous as to the
extent of the President’s constitutional power to withhold
information.111 Nixon ultimately submitted to a judicial
request to turn over the information; however, the Court
also gave some credence to Nixon’s argument that the
executive branch has the power to refuse to turn over
information.112 The Court held that “[c]ertain powers and
privileges flow from the nature of enumerated
[constitutional] powers; the protection of the confidentiality
of [p]residential communications has similar constitutional
underpinnings.”113
The Court did not discredit Nixon’s argument that the
President has a right to withhold presidential
communications.114 Nixon argued that all governments
share a common and valid need to protect communications
between highlevel officials.115 The Court agreed, reasoning
that “the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to
require further discussion . . . . [T]hose who expect public
dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor
with a concern for appearances and for their own interests
to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.”116 Nixon
also argued that the independence of the executive branch
109. Statement of the President Upon Establishing a New Classification
System and Directing the Acceleration of Publication of the “Foreign Relations”
Series, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 542, 543 (Mar. 8, 1972).
110. See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
111. See id. at 706.
112. Id. at 70506.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 706.
115. Id. at 705.
116. Id.
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under the separation of powers doctrine absolutely protects
presidential communications from disclosure to the other
branches.117 The Supreme Court neither directly confirmed
nor denied this assertion. Instead, the Court wrote that that
“neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need
for confidentiality of highlevel communications, without
more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified [p]residential
privilege of immunity from judicial process under all
circumstances.”118 This implies that, in some circumstances,
the Executive may have an absolute power to withhold
information.
The Court qualified its right to call on the President to
release confidential information, writing that, “[a]bsent a
claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive
national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the
argument that even the very important interest in
confidentiality of [p]residential communications is
significantly diminished by production of such material for
in camera inspection . . . .”119 The Court likened Nixon’s
privilege to withhold confidential information to the
constitutional right of a citizen to expect privacy.120
In a lateterm policy memo, the Bush administration
used Nixon to support its claim of right to absolutely
withhold military and diplomatic secrets.121 Likewise, the
Obama administration quoted Nixon in its Mohawk
Industries amicus brief when arguing that “‘[t]he privilege is
fundamental to the operation of [g]overnment and
117. Id. at 706.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 708. Additionally, the Court reasoned that “[t]here is nothing novel
about governmental confidentiality. The meetings of the Constitutional
Convention in 1787 were conducted in complete privacy.” Id. at 705 n.15 (citing
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at xixxv (Max Farrand
ed. 1911)). “Moreover, all records of those meetings were sealed for more than
[thirty] years after the Convention.” Id. (citing 3 Stat. 475, J. Res. 8, 15th Cong.
(1818)). “Most of the Framers acknowledged that without secrecy no constitution
of the kind that was developed could have been written.” Id. (citing CHARLES
WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 13439 (1937)).
121. See National Security Operations Memorandum, supra note 17, at 3
(“The state secrets privilege is based on the President’s Article II power to
conduct foreign affairs and to provide for the national defense, and therefore has
constitutional underpinnings.”); see also Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710.
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inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution,’ and it derives largely from the ‘necessity for
protection of the public interest in . . . [p]residential
decisionmaking.’”122
Throughout the late nineteenth century, various United
States attorneys general “reiterated the opinion that the
[P]resident has absolute power to withhold documents in
the face of a judicial order.”123 Although courts disagree
about whether the privilege is rooted in common law or the
Constitution, courts have often cited Nixon as standing for
the President’s right to withhold secrets that are “inimical
to national security.”124
At least one critic of the executive viewpoint of the state
secrets privilege differentiates the constitutional reasoning
in Nixon from application to the modern state secrets
privilege, arguing that the executive privilege to keep
presidential communications in confidence at issue in Nixon
differs from the ability to withhold information created by
and for executive agencies.125 In Presidential Secrecy and the
122. Mohawk Brief, supra note 17, at 2829 (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708).
123. PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 14, at 96. “For example, in 1865, Attorney
General James Speed stated that presidents are ‘not bound to produce papers or
disclose information communicated to them where, in their own judgment, the
disclosure would, on public considerations, be inexpedient.’” Id. (quoting 11 Op.
Att’y Gen. 137, 14243 (1865)). “And on the matter of compulsion, in 1905
Attorney General William Moody opined that ‘it seems clear that while a
subpoena may be directed against the President to produce a paper, or for some
other purpose, in case of his refusal to obey the subpoena, the courts would be
without power to enforce process.’” Id. (quoting 25 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 33031
(1905)). The author then interjected his view that there was “nothing in law to
support these assertions . . . .” Id.
124. Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1991)
(“The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary rule that allows the
government to withhold information from discovery when disclosure would be
inimical to national security.”); see also ElMasri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296,
303 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The Nixon court [recognized] that, to the extent an
executive claim of privilege ‘relates to the effective discharge of a President’s
powers, it is constitutionally based’ . . . . [T]he Executive’s constitutional
authority is at its broadest in the realm of military and foreign affairs.” (quoting
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711)); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev’d
on other grounds, In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“Courts should
accord the ‘utmost deference’ to executive assertions of privilege upon grounds of
military or diplomatic secrets.” (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710)).
125. See PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 14, at 93.
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Law, the authors argue that the executive privilege, which
attaches only to the President and protects him from
predation by Congress and the public, acts as a qualified
privilege subject to a balancing test, while the state secrets
privilege attaches to the heads of agencies and acts as an
absolute privilege relying on practicality more than
constitutional principle.126
This argument remains unsound. Presidential
authority, though delegated to the heads of the executive
agencies, is not removed from the presidency itself. Indeed,
the executive agency heads serve at the pleasure of the
President. When making decisions—especially those related
to military and intelligence matters—agency heads are
drawing on the President’s constitutional authority. In El
Masri v. United States, the Fourth Circuit explained that
“the Executive’s constitutional authority is at its broadest in
the realm of military and foreign affairs.”127
Also, as explained in Nixon, to the extent a claim of
privilege concerns areas of Article II duties, “the courts have
traditionally shown the utmost deference to [p]residential
responsibilities.”128 The fact that the head of an agency must
lodge the formal claim of privilege129 could not remove from
the President the ability to assert the privilege himself. The
President acts as the ultimate director of all executive
agencies. The state secrets privilege does not vest solely
with the heads of executive agencies, but in the President
himself, as delegated to agency heads.
Therefore, the privilege of withholding military secrets
should not be treated differently than the privilege to
withhold highlevel communications. The practical and
constitutional reasoning for secrecy is identical for the two
types of information. For practical reasons, the President
and his executive branch members must be able to
communicate freely about information in order to make
decisions—they must be able to maintain informational
records in order to make decisions without fear that
maintaining decisionmaking records will endanger national
security. Under the Constitution, the President alone
126. Id.
127. ElMasri, 479 F.3d at 303.
128. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710.
129. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 78 (1953).
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retains the power to command executive agencies to provide
written information about any subject.130 Likewise, the
President alone acts as the Commander in Chief of the
military, and shares the power and burden of military
information.131 If the potential security of many outweighs a
potential legal remedy for an individual, the President must
protect the many by securing secret information.132
The executive branch presents, on its face, a strong
argument—especially with regard to military and foreign
relations secrets. Despite its seemingly staunch position of
absolute authority, the executive branch has never refused
outright to turn over information at the request of the
judicial branch. Therefore, in substance if not in form, the
executive has acquiesced to the judicial position that state
secrets are subject to judicial review. The executive branch
has taken the de facto position that state secrets protection
is a privilege, not a right, and therefore, carries at least
some limitations. The consistent acquiescence by the
executive branch may represent a tactical move to appease
Congress to avoid escalating the debate to a showdown
about the privilege, or, it may represent a genuine
acknowledgment of the legitimacy of judicial review in such
matters.
Regardless of the reasoning, the executive branch’s
actions support the idea of judicial review and belie the folly
of the executive’s argument. The federal system relies on
intergovernmental cooperation and trust because no branch
has direct control over another branch—only checks and
balances. If the Executive holds, as he claims, an absolute,
irrefutable power to withhold information, then the system
of checks and balances that ensures cooperation and trust
will fail because there is no check to balance executive
power. The executive will continue to argue that the
judiciary should not ask for such information; however,
when asked, the executive will likely continue to oblige.
Therefore, the viewpoint espoused by the executive branch
fails as an extreme solution that avoids the practical reality
of government functioning.

130. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 1.
131. Id.
132. See generally Executive Privilege Memorandum, supra note 107.
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B. The Congressional Approach
Congress wants the courts to review all information
claimed secret under the privilege. As the only branch of
government comprised of directly elected officials without
term limits, Congress arguably remains the most sensitive
to political pressure from scholars and commentators. Over
the past decade, as the state secrets privilege has become
more widely used, it has also become the subject of
increased criticism. As one scholar notes, “[e]xploiting the
legitimate claims of secrecy, the executive branch habitually
overclassifies documents, absurdly segments scientific
research, and maintains convenient shields to protect
administrators from the curiosity of the public and the
press.”133 Such criticism has pressured Congress to take
action to curtail what many see as an unchecked executive
abuse of power. Indeed, former Republican (now
Democratic) Senator Arlen Spector stated:
In view of its increasing use, inconsistent application, and public
criticism, we think the time is ripe to pass legislation codifying
standards on the state secrets privilege. Our bill builds upon
proposals by the American Bar Association and legal scholars who
have called upon Congress to legislate in this area.134

Congress argues that it has the constitutional authority to
make such laws, considering its powers to “make [r]ules for
the [g]overnment and [r]egulation of the land and naval
[f]orces” and “make all [l]aws which shall be necessary and
proper” for carrying out its powers.135
Congress does not effectively address the argument that
using legislation based largely on the American Bar
Association (“ABA”) and academic analyses may fail to take
into consideration the practical and real security threats
underlying any mandatory disclosure regime. Instead of
relying on executive officials who have all necessary
contextual information to make a decision, the
congressional approach places decision making about
disclosure in the hands of judges who likely do not have
133. LONGAKER, supra note 29, at 175.
134. S. REP. NO. 110442, at 9 (2008) (quoting 154 CONG. REC. S199 (daily ed.
Jan. 23, 2008) (statement of Sen. Specter)).
135. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
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enough contextual information to make appropriate
decisions about disclosure. Congress does this because it
wants to prevent conflicts of interest in the decisionmaking
process. However, a judge’s job in relation to the state
secrets privilege should involve preventing executive abuses
and conflicts of interest, but should not involve the making
of disclosure decisions. Congress fails to recognize the
nuance of this distinction in its proposed legislation, and
does not propose an effective way to accomplish the
prevention without transferring complete oversight of
disclosure to the judiciary.
President George W. Bush, like other Presidents
throughout history, arguably abused legal doctrines—even
the Constitution—to avoid some harm or reap some
benefit.136 “[T]he Bush administration has raised the
privilege in over 25% more cases per year than previous
administrations, and has sought dismissal in over 90% more
cases.”137 However, even before the Bush administration
came to power, executive use of the privilege had been
rising. As one author notes,
[i]n the twentythree years between the decision in Reynolds and
the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976, there are eleven reported
cases where the government invoked the privilege. Since 1977,
there have been more than seventy reported cases where the
courts ruled on invocation of the privilege . . . . In only four cases
have courts ultimately rejected the government’s assertion of the
privilege . . . in two of those cases the privilege was obviously
misused to protect unclassified information in the Department of
Commerce.138

136. See, e.g., LONGAKER, supra note 29, at 23 (“In the early days of the
Republic, John Adams encouraged and abetted the Alien and Sedition Acts,
while Jefferson contributed to their demise; at the same moment Lincoln
brought about the end of Negro slavery, he trampled on constitutional rights in
order to save the Constitution; and Woodrow Wilson presided over the
suppression of individual rights during the First World War in an effort to
secure freedom for millions abroad . . . . Andrew Jackson threatened to dispatch
troops to uphold the law against a recalcitrant southern state; Theodore
Roosevelt broke the color line in White House social propriety; Warren G.
Harding used the pardoning power to mitigate some of the injustices of World
War I.”).
137. S. REP. NO. 110442, at 8 (2008).
138. PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 14, at 106.
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Congress fails to acknowledge that the increase in use
may not correlate to increased abuse. As the federal
government has grown larger and the latest technology
revolution has made information exponentially more
accessible, it is plausible that the government has a larger
volume of information and, therefore, must keep more
secrets. Therefore, abuse may or may not be widespread. It
is difficult to justify a claim of abuse based solely on the fact
that state secrets cases have become more frequent.
Some recent cases arguably indicate possible abuse;139
however, pinpointing the breadth of abuse remains difficult
because of the inherently secret nature of the information.
Whether or not the executive branch engages in
impropriety, one can certainly recognize its appearance. The
executive branch has a blatant conflict of interest in some
instances since the same executive agency may be the
subject of a lawsuit while simultaneously having exclusive
authority to make disclosure decisions about information
relevant to that lawsuit.
President Clinton recognized this conflict when issuing
Executive Order 12958, which forbids the classification of
information in order to “(1) conceal violations of law,
inefficiency, or administrative error; (2) prevent
embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; (3)
restrain competition; or (4) prevent or delay the release of
information that does not require protection in the interest
of national security.”140 In contrast, the Bush administration
broadened the applicability and scope of the privilege in
2001, with Executive Order 13233, which extended
presidential secrecy to former Presidents to prevent
disclosure of information generated during their
presidencies.141 Also during the Bush administration, many
departments that could not previously classify documents

139. See Lyons, supra note 33, at 11118 (listing and explaining the use of the
privilege in several cases and then explaining that the cases are examples of
“overbroad and blanket assertions” of the state secrets privilege).
140. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995).
141. PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 14, at 117.
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and claim the state secrets privilege gained the authority to
do so.142
Under pressure to reign in the privilege after perceived
abuses during the Bush years, President Obama
implemented a policy requiring Department of Justice
approval for state secret claims which makes further steps
to check abuse; however, this policy does not necessarily
require actual disclosure of information between agencies,
only a description of the information sought to be kept
secret.143
Congress takes issue with the fact that the courts do not
provide a preemptive check on possible abuses by requiring
in camera review in all state secrets cases. Congress
advocates for such review with the proposed State Secrets
Protection Act (“SSPA”);144 it rejects the idea that executive
secretkeeping has a basis in the Constitution, instead
arguing that the privilege is merely a common law rule of
evidence which, like other privileges such as attorneyclient,
priestpenitent,
and
patientdoctor,
Congress
can
legislate.145
However, Congress did not always take such a
restrictive view of the privilege. In 1960, the 86th Congress
issued a report stating that “[t]he authority enabling the
executive branch to withhold information is found in some
one hundred and seventy statutes and in constitutional
reasoning which rests on the separation of powers and
presidential responsibility for foreign policy.”146 In the same
report, however, Congress provided a list of generally
“unwarranted” secrecy cases, emphasizing its disapproval of
alleged abuse by the executive.147
142. Id. at 87 (the Department of Agriculture, Department of Health and
Human Services, Environmental Protection Agency, and the Office of Science
and Technology Policy).
143. See State Secrets Privilege Memorandum, supra note 49, at 13.
144. S. 417, 111th Cong. § 4054(d)(1) (2009).
145. See S. REP. NO. 110442, at 68 (2008).
146. LONGAKER, supra note 29, at 176 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 2084, H. COMM. ON
GOV’T OPS., 86TH CONG., TWENTYFOURTH REP. ON AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION
FROM FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES (1960)).
147. Id. at 186 n.15 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 2084, H. COMM. ON GOV’T OPS., 86TH
CONG., TWENTYFOURTH REP. ON AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES 436 (1960)).
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During the Nixon administration, Congress attempted,
but failed, to enact legislation to counter these
“unwarranted” secrecy cases. As part of the process to adopt
the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress ultimately
evaluated and rejected proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
509 which would have defined and set guidelines for use of
the state secrets privilege.148 Some scholars argue that
Congress rejected Rule 509 because it would have expanded
and legitimized the privilege.149 However, other sources
argue that Congress rejected the rule because the
Department of Justice, part of the executive branch, lobbied
strongly against the rule as a curtailment of executive
power.150 In either case, Rule 509 was rejected, and
Congress never passed a law governing use of the state
secrets privilege.
Rule 509 would have taken a more balanced approach to
the process for claiming the state secrets privilege than that
taken by Congress in the SSPA. The Advisory Committee
Notes of Rule 509 explain that “[t]he showing required as a
condition precedent to claiming the privilege represents a
compromise between complete judicial control and accepting
as final the decision of a departmental officer.”151 In
contrast, section 4054 of the proposed SSPA requires the
courts to take full control, reviewing all evidence claimed
148. FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1972).
149. See Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 88
(2002) (“In the wake of the Watergate scandal, Congress did not look fondly
upon proposed Rule 509, which redefined—and arguably expanded—the scope of
the secrets of state and official information privileges.”); Raymond F. Miller,
Creating Evidentiary Privileges: An Argument for the Judicial Approach, 31
CONN. L. REV. 771, 774 (1999) (“In 1973, in addition to considering the rules of
evidence, Congress and the nation were grappling with the unfolding Watergate
situation. The idea that executive secrets would now be protected by statute
invoked a violent reaction.”).
150. FISHER, supra note 14, at 14045 (discussing the Justice Department’s
strong opposition to the proposed rule). The Department of Justice wanted the
rule changed “to recognize that the [E]xecutive’s classification of information as
a state secret was final and binding on judges.” Id. at 141. “In addition to the
opposition from the Justice Department, several prominent members of
Congress voiced their objections” because of procedural issues, and because the
rule might have weakened the decision in Reynolds. Id.
151. FED. R. EVID. 509 advisory committee’s note subdiv. (b) (Proposed Draft
1972).
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under the privilege unless the volume of evidence is so great
that sampling is required.152
Instead of adopting rules that separated and defined
legal privileges (e.g., attorneyclient, priestpenitent,
spousal, etc.), Congress adopted Federal Rule of Evidence
501.153 Rule 501 enables privileges to develop through
common law, unless guidance is otherwise provided for by
“Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority.”154 As Louis Fisher
explains in his book, In the Name of National Security, the
legislative history of Rule 501 explains why the provisions
in Rule 509 were rejected.155 “When the bill reached the
House floor, it came with a closed rule that prohibited
amendments to it. The privileges covered by the rule
(including government secrets . . . ) were considered
‘matters of substantive law’ rather than rules of evidence . .
. .”156 Congress was “so divided on that subject” that it
“would never get a bill [out] if [it] got bogged down in that
subject matter . . . .”157 Congress did, however, pass
significant legislation in the latter half of the twentieth
century to curtail executive abilities to conduct activities
that may necessitate secret activities,158 and to make
government information more accessible and transparent.159
Despite its initial failure/refusal to codify the state
secrets privileges in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
Congress believes it retains the right to do so. As Congress
152. S. 417, 111th Cong. § 4054(d) (2009).
153. FED. R. EVID. 501 (“Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of
the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience.”).
154. Id.
155. FISHER, supra note 14, at 145 (providing a history of the language used in
the many versions of Rule 509 before its ultimate rejection by Congress).
156. Id. (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 1409 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974) (statement of
Rep. Dennis)).
157. Id.
158. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 116 (2000);
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 180163 (2000).
159. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
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explained with Rule 501, the common law may only govern
in lieu of an Act of Congress, constitutional guidance, or
Supreme Court rules under statutory authority.160 Since
adopting Rule 501, Congress has only modified privilege
rules on one occasion.161
The Senate argues that it can legislate the state secrets
privilege because judges already have the power to review
evidence claimed secret under the privilege, however, the
power of judicial review often goes “unused.”162 In order to
force judges to use their oversight authority, the new Senate
bill “requires judges to look at the evidence that the
[g]overnment claim is privileged . . . .”163 Additionally, the
bill
forbids judges from dismissing cases at the pleadings stage on the
basis of the privilege. This makes clear that the . . . privilege is an
evidentiary rule, not a justiciability rule, and can only be asserted
with respect to items of evidence that plaintiffs seek in discovery
or intend to disclose in litigation.164

In its report on the SSPA, the Senate Judiciary
Committee rebutted the executive’s constitutional claim.165
The Committee explained that the executive has “relied
heavily on Department of Navy v. Egan . . . for the
proposition that statutes regulating the disclosure of
sensitive national security information may raise
constitutional concerns.”166 Egan, however, also holds that
“unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts
traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the
authority of the Executive in military and national security
affairs.”167 This, states the Committee, “plainly implies that
160. FED. R. EVID. 501.
161. In 2008, President George W. Bush signed S. 2450, creating Rule 502,
which provides guidelines about attorneyclient privilege, work product
privilege, and limitations on waiver. See FED. R. EVID. 502.
162. S. REP. NO. 110442, at 11 (2008).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1112.
165. Id. at 78 n.37.
166. Id. (citing Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988)).
167. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 530) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Congress possesses the constitutional authority to pass such
regulations.”168 The Committee fails to note that the Court
in Egan acknowledged “the generally accepted view that
foreign policy was the province and responsibility of the
Executive[,]”169 and also acknowledged that “the courts have
traditionally shown the utmost deference” for “Art. II
duties.”170
Although, at the time of publishing this Comment,
committees have not yet reported on the House bill, the
substance of the bill is essentially the same as that of the
Senate bill.171 The majority congressional position has some
support from the Supreme Court. The Court in Bourjaily v.
United States noted that “Nixon [was] decided before
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence,” implying
that the rules of evidence may have governed, or at least
persuaded, the Court in its holding.172
Like the courts, Congress is not unified on the issue of
the constitutionality of the privilege or the necessity of the
SSPA. In the 2008 Senate Committee report on the SSPA,
the minority opinion argued that the judiciary and
executive branches have, over the past two centuries, struck
a compromise which “sets the right balance between
openness, justice, and national security.”173 The minority
also argued that the privilege is rooted in both “the common

168. Id. The Senate Committee also noted that “the Court in Egan appears to
have adopted this formulation from the Justice Department itself, which argued
in its brief that ‘[a]bsent an unambiguous grant of jurisdiction by Congress,
courts have traditionally been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the
executive in military and national security affairs.’” Id. (quoting Brief for the
Petitioner at 21 Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) (No. 86–1552)).
169. Egan, 484 U.S. at 529 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 29394 (1981))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Id. at 52930 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
171. Compare State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. (2009), with
State Secret Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984 111th Cong. (2009).
172. 483 U.S. 171, 172 (1987) (using the Federal Rules of Evidence to hold that
a court is permitted to consider outofcourt statements of an alleged co
conspirator when making its preliminary factual determinations about the
statement’s admissibility).
173. S. REP. NO. 110442, at 37 (2008).

1222

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

law and the Constitution’s separation of powers.”174
Considering its long and settled history in the courts, the
minority argues that legislation is unnecessary. Indeed,
“judges already have the necessary tools and procedures to
adjudicate state secrets cases. The courts have carefully
crafted state secrets doctrine to give themselves wide
procedural latitude, and to preserve for themselves the
ultimate determination of whether the government has
proven that the state secrets privilege is properly
invoked.”175 Note the difference between the government
proving the privilege is “properly invoked” and the courts
making the ultimate decision about what to disclose or not
to disclose. The minority wants the courts to perform the
former task, not the latter, and believes the courts already
have the necessary tools to do this; therefore, “legislative
intervention is not urgent.”176 The comments in this report
by both the majority and the minority died along with the
original bill, S2253.
The bill, in its new form as S471, has been given back
to the Senate Judiciary Committee of the 111th Congress.
Support for the bill appears divided along partisan lines,
with Democrats sponsoring the bill and Republicans
speaking out against it. In recent comments, Republican
Senator Orren Hatch said the new bill will “bring chaos to
the balance struck by Reynolds.”177 The tumultuous political
reality on the Hill during the 111th Congress creates a high
probability that the bill will die again with the election of
the 112th Congress in November, 2010. The bill’s future
rests on the makeup of the new Congress. However, even if
the bill does not get a new life in its current form, the
debate will certainly resurface in some other form, as it has
for the past two centuries.
A standoff has emerged between the congressional
Democrats who claim they have the constitutional right to
174. Id. at 37. The minority argued that “[t]he Common Law roots of the
privilege date back at least to the early 17th Century . . . . By the time of the
framing of the Constitution, the state secrets privilege was so enshrined in the
common law that Blackstone took note of the privilege in his Commentaries on
the Laws of England.” Id. at 3738.
175. Id. at 39.
176. Id.
177. 155 CONG. REC. S6438 (daily ed. June 10, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
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legislate the privilege as an evidentiary rule, and the
executive branch, which treats the privilege as a right of
office—a fundamental constitutionallygrounded power
reserved for the President to protect national security.
As with the absolute power view espoused by the
executive branch, the congressionallyadvocated, forced
judicial review of all state secrets, cannot stand under the
practical reality of realworld governance issues. Even if
judges review all secret information, they lack the
competency to provide the soughtafter check on abuse.
Decisions about information secrecy must be made in the
context of a larger base of knowledge. Judges lack this
context. Instead, they will be forced to view information out
of context, as the expediency of review cannot permit an
unlimited look through agency records to ascertain a full
context in all cases. Also, judges will still remain at the
mercy of representations by executive officials.
To make a decision about allowing assertion of the
privilege, a judge need not understand the exact
information at issue; he or she only need understand the
type of information sought to be protected. It would not
matter, for instance, whether a new military weapon tends
to overheat at 121 degrees Fahrenheit or 131 degrees
Fahrenheit—it matters only that the information sought
contains information that might confirm or deny the
existence of a certain new weapon. In most cases, there is no
need for judges to know the details of secrets to make
assessments of their security risk. Since the executive
branch is already required to disclose, under Reynolds, the
type of information sought to be protected, there is no need
to burden the courts with details.
In rare cases where a specific detail matters, judges can
request in camera inspections. However, in some cases,
even the occurrence of an in camera inspection will reveal
that certain records exist, and therefore tend to confirm or
deny certain information. Disclosure of secret information
(as opposed to disclosure of types of information) requires a
judge to make decisions about areas in which he or she has
no expertise, is without any knowledge of the greater
context of available information, and assumes an
impermissible risk of disclosure of detrimental information.
Such a position leaves no flexibility, and may result in a
breakdown of trust between the executive and judicial
branches, or may reduce the efficiency and transparency in
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C. The Judicial Role: A Compromise
The judiciary recognizes the executive branch’s power to
withhold information, but only in certain circumstances.
Depending on the reason for information secrecy, the
executive action may fall under the executive’s
constitutional powers, or may fall under common law. In El
Masri v. United States, the Fourth Circuit articulated the
position that the state secrets privilege may have dual
origins, explaining that, “[a]lthough the state secrets
privilege was developed at common law, it performs a
function of constitutional significance, because it allows the
executive branch to protect information whose secrecy is
necessary
to
its
military
and
foreignaffairs
responsibilities.”178
The courts have, over time, categorized types of
information claimed secret under the privilege, treating
different types of information in different ways. For
instance, in Tenet v. Doe, the Supreme Court explained that
the executive branch must receive utmost deference with
respect to military and intelligence secrets.179 However, in In
re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records
Litigation,180 a district court held, on remand from the Ninth
Circuit,181 that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(“FISA”)182 preempts the state secrets privilege because the
subject matter of FISA is regulated by Congress.
178. 479 F.3d 296, 303 (4th Cir. 2007).
179. 544 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
180. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telcoms. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109
(N.D. Cal. 2008).
181. See AlHaramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 120506
(9th Cir. 2007) (“AlHaramain posits that FISA preempts the state secrets
privilege. The district court chose not to rule on this issue . . . . Now, however,
the FISA issue remains central to AlHaramain’s ability to proceed with this
lawsuit. Rather than consider the issue for the first time on appeal, we remand
to the district court to consider whether FISA preempts the state secrets
privilege and for any proceedings collateral to that determination.”) (citations
omitted), remanded sub. nom. In re Nat’l Security Agency, 564 F. Supp. 2d at
1109.
182. 50 U.S.C. §§180163 (2000).
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Although courts have rarely invoked their ability to
review information, and even less rarely denied the claim of
privilege, courts have never acknowledged the state secrets
privilege as an absolute power. The executive invocation of
the privilege is a power which must be balanced against the
power of judicial review.183 In Haig v. Agee, the Supreme
Court articulated that, “[m]atters intimately related to
foreign policy and national security are rarely proper
subjects for judicial intervention.”184 However, this power
must be balanced by considering the circumstances of the
request while giving special deference to military issues.
Throughout the two centuries since Burr, the courts
have created a framework for balancing the power of the
judiciary to review constitutional issues against the power
of the executive to protect military matters. The Supreme
Court has given full consideration to congressional
legislation in matters not directly related to the military,
such as wiretapping and other intelligencegathering
mechanisms. This nuanced approach provides the flexibility
necessary to preserve the necessary separation of powers. In
contrast, neither the executive claim of absolute privilege
nor the congressional attempt to force judicial review allows
for the flexibility needed to adjudge state secrets issues
without creating an imbalance of power.
The approach taken by the judiciary, however, does not
directly address the criticism that the executive often
abuses the privilege and the judiciary is not performing its
role as reviewer with enough frequency to discourage such
abuses. If the judiciary applies a balancing test to each
claim, and the executive frequently passes the balancing
tests with abusive uses of the privilege, then the balancing
test fails, at least in the eyes of Congress.
However, if the judiciary is to make an error, we must
decide whether the error should favor secrecy or disclosure.
If our utilitarian approach to national security has any
legitimacy, then judges must err on the side of secrecy. We
have already given preferential treatment to secrecy over

183. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) (explaining that
courts have a constitutional duty to review issues of law and determine
constitutionality).
184. 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981).
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disclosure by allowing legitimate claims of secrecy to
absolutely trump individual rights.185
To counter abuse, we must rely on political processes
rather than legislation. The government is designed to allow
“we the people” to elect officials who will act as trustworthy
secretkeepers. If an executive abuses his power, we have
checks, balances, and safeguards to remove him from office
through democratic processes. The actual or alleged abuse
by one executive should not create a presumption that the
privilege is a bad practice or that the laws surrounding use
of the privilege must change. The Executive has a myriad of
powers, such as the ability to grant pardons, the ability to
issue signing statements, and the ability to refuse to enforce
laws, which he may abuse if so inclined. However, it would
be ridiculous to suggest that Congress should control every
potential executive abuse through legislation. This would
destroy the fundamental powers inherent in the executive
branch. Rather, political processes, court cases, and the
media should remain the predominant tools to keep
presidential power in check.
Likewise, when considering the state secrets privilege,
we must take a balanced approach that will stand
consistently throughout time. The judiciary remains the
only branch advocating for balance, while the executive and
the legislative branches argue for extreme approaches. If we
accept either extreme position, the issue becomes polarizing.
Indeed, if the power to withhold state secrets is absolute
and cannot be checked through the process of judicial
review—as the executive branch often insinuates—it
becomes a potentially dangerous power. However, despite
executive rhetoric about the absolute nature of the
privilege, the executive branch has never refused to comply
with judicial requests to turn over information.186 If a
president did refuse, we would be in a constitutional
quandary since the executive controls the enforcement
procedures of laws.

185. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “[O]nce
invoked, the privilege is ‘absolute’ and ‘cannot be compromised by any showing
of need on the part of the party seeking the information.’” Id. (quoting Northrop
Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
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Considering the history of compliance with judicial
review, the respect accorded by the executive to the powers
of the courts, and the quandary presented should the
executive refuse a judicial request for information, there is
no reason to believe that the executive branch will remain,
in practice, staunch in its “absolute power” interpretation.
The only thing likely to create such behavior in the
executive is legislation by Congress requiring judicial
review. If Congress passes the SSPA, the executive may
withhold information in order to seek a Supreme Court
decision on the legitimacy of the law. If such a situation
arises, the Court will either relinquish their request as
unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine,
nullifying the SSPA, or, will reiterate their request, with no
mechanism for enforcement, creating a potentially
devastating rift in the stability of the federal government.
Therefore, the congressional approach cannot stand the test
of time.
Rather than take a radical approach which may force a
radical response, we must take a balanced approach that
will remain consistent yet flexible. The judicial approach,
which allows for executive control with limited judicial
review, achieves this end. The judiciary has the capacity to
act as a neutral fulcrum with the balance and flexibility
necessary to adapt to the changing landscape of national
security while retaining the consistency necessary to apply
the privilege in a way that considers appropriately the issue
of secrecy versus disclosure.
III. EXTERNAL CONFLICTS PRESENTED BY EXTRAORDINARY
RENDITION
As discussed above, a critical analysis of the internal
United States conflict over the state secrets privilege
discloses a host of legal conundrums about the separation of
powers and the nature of the Constitution. Ultimately, at
least in the internal context, the judicial branch takes the
most defensible position on the definition and control of the
state secrets privilege. However, the discussion of internal
divisions over the privilege only recognizes as stakeholders
the three branches of government and, to a lesser extent,
persons who may face the state secrets privilege in court.
Before coming to a final conclusion on the appropriate role
for the privilege, we must acknowledge additional
stakeholders, namely, foreign governments and private
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businesses that interact with our government in foreign
relations and military contexts.
To explore the role and relevance of these stakeholders
in United States secretkeeping, we can look to three recent
cases concerning the United States’ extraordinary rendition
program. The program, which involves detaining and
transporting suspected terrorists to foreign countries for
interrogation, requires significant cooperation from foreign
governments and private businesses. This cooperation is so
intrinsic to the extraordinary rendition program, that a
successful claim brought against the United States by an
aggrieved party would likely expose, not only United States
involvement in a particular instance, but also secret
agreements, communications, and alliances between the
United States and foreign governments or cooperating
organizations.
A discussion of the legality of the extraordinary
rendition program is outside the scope of this Comment.
The tremendous conflict over this question, however,
deserves acknowledgement. It remains unclear whether the
United States government has the legitimate power to
detain and transport noncitizens to foreign countries for
interrogations—especially if the United States has actual or
constructive knowledge that the detainee will be
interrogated illegally or tortured. These issues warrant
serious consideration and have been discussed extensively
in other articles.187 For the sake of this Comment, it is
enough to say that the United States government has
acknowledged the existence of the program.188 An analysis of
the cases that discuss this program and its relation to the
state secrets privilege will yield insight into the concerns
187. See, e.g., Jillian Button, Spirited Away (Into a Legal Black Hole?): The
Challenge of Invoking State Responsibility for Extraordinary Rendition, 19 FLA.
J. INT’L L. 531 (2007); Comm. on Int’l Human Rights, Torture by Proxy:
International and Domestic Law Applicable to “Extraordinary Renditions,” 60
REC. 13 (2005); Victor Hansen, Extraordinary Renditions and the State Secrets
Privilege: Keeping Focus on the Task at Hand, 33 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
629 (2007); Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary
Rendition Under International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 309 (2006);
Mario Silva, Extraordinary Rendition: A Challenge to Canadian and United
States Legal Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture, 39 CAL. W. INT’L
L.J. 313 (2009).
188. See ElMasri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 2007).
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raised by external conflicts, and whether the external
conflicts complicate or support the conclusion that the
judiciary is best poised to assess the appropriateness of the
application of the state secrets privilege after the executive
has determined that the privilege should be applied.
A. Case #1: ElMasri v. United States189
In 2006, Khaled ElMasri, a German man of Lebanese
descent, filed a complaint with the District Court of Virginia
against three corporate defendants, ten CIA employees,
former CIA director George Tenet, and ten employees of
defendant corporations.190 The complaint alleged that, while
travelling in Macedonia, ElMasri had been detained in
December 2003 by Macedonian law enforcement, kept in
custody for twentythree days, transferred to the custody of
CIA operatives, flown to a CIAoperated detention facility in
Afghanistan, held for several months, and eventually
released in May 2004.191 The man alleged he was held
against his will, beaten, bound, blindfolded, and prevented
from communicating with outside persons.192
“The United States intervened as a defendant in the
district court, asserting that ElMasri’s civil action could not
proceed because it posed an unreasonable risk that
privileged state secrets would be disclosed.”193 The district
court agreed, dismissing the complaint.194 ElMasri appealed
to the Fourth Circuit, arguing the district court erred by
misapplying the state secrets doctrine.195 The Fourth Circuit
reviewed de novo dismissal on state secrets grounds.196
The plaintiff claimed that the state secrets privilege
was not properly applied because the extraordinary
rendition program had been “widely discussed in public
forums,” and therefore the information could not be
189. Id. at 296.
190. Id. at 299.
191. Id. at 300.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 299300.
194. ElMasri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 541 (E.D. Va. 2006).
195. ElMasri, 479 F.3d at 300.
196. Id. at 302 (citing Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 342 (4th Cir. 2005)).
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considered secret.197 In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit
explained that “both the Supreme Court and this Court
have recognized that the Executive’s constitutional mandate
encompasses the authority to protect national security
information.”198 “The state secrets privilege that the United
States has interposed in this civil proceeding thus has a
firm foundation in the Constitution, in addition to its basis
in the common law of evidence.”199
ElMasri argued that the “facts essential to his
[c]omplaint have largely been made public,” and that “the
subject of this action is simply ‘a rendition and its
consequences,’” with the critical facts being “the CIA’s
operation of a rendition program targeted at terrorism
suspects, plus the tactics employed therein.”200 He argued
that these facts “have been so widely discussed that
litigation concerning them could do no harm to national
security.”201
In response to this argument, the court held that the
above mentioned facts were not those central to the case.202
Instead, these facts were just “the general terms in which
ElMasri has related his story to the press.”203 For ElMasri
to proceed with his claim, the court would have to
determine the personal liability of each defendant.204 Such a
determination would include, for instance, “evidence that
exposes how the CIA organizes, staffs, and supervises its
most sensitive intelligence operations . . . how the head of
the CIA participates in such operations, and how
information concerning their progress is relayed to him . . .
[and] the existence and details of CIA espionage contracts
. . . .”205 Furthermore, ElMasri would have to rely on
witnesses to make these showings “whose identities . . .
197. Id. at 301.
198. Id. at 304 (citing Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988); United
States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1315 (4th Cir. 1972)).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 308.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 309.
205. Id.
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must remain confidential in the interest of national
security.”206
Lastly, even if ElMasri could make out a prima facie
case without state secrets, the court held that the
defendants could not present a defense “without using
privileged evidence.”207 The court then discussed several
scenarios whereby any defense would require privileged
information. Next, the court summarized several cases
where claims had been dismissed pursuant to a government
claim that the disclosure of CIA methods of operations, the
malfunctioning of military weapons, classified operating
locations of the Air Force, and sensitive CIA personnel
decisions would have been required.208
ElMasri also claimed that the district court should
have reviewed the documents in camera because of their
constitutional duty to review claims of egregious misconduct
by the executive.209 In response, the court first quoted the
holding in Reynolds that “when ‘the occasion for the
privilege is appropriate, . . . the court should not jeopardize
the security which the privilege is meant to protect by
insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the
judge alone, in chambers.’”210 Also, the court countered El
Masri’s assertion that this decision represents a “surrender
of judicial control” by reasoning that “the court, not the
Executive . . . determines whether the state secrets privilege
has been properly invoked.”211 The court ultimately upheld
the dismissal of ElMasri’s claim based on the United States
government’s insertion of itself as a defendant and assertion
of the state secrets privilege.212
ElMasri highlights the difference between types of
wrongdoing and methods of wrongdoing. In ElMasri, the
plaintiff sought justice from wrongs inflicted by a program,
the existence of which is widely publicized and
acknowledged. However, the privilege was not invoked to
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 31011.
209. Id. at 311.
210. Id. (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)).
211. Id. at 312.
212. Id. at 313.
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protect from disclosure the facts of whether these wrongs
occurred. Instead, the privilege was used to protect the
identities of persons inside and outside the government who
allegedly perpetrated the wrongs, the roles of those persons
and organizations, and the agreements made between the
government and outside organizations.
Indeed, the plaintiff defined the essential facts of his
case differently than the court. ElMasri focused in his
claim on the consequences of alleged wrongful acts. The
court, however, focused on the decisionmaking methods,
government agreements and clandestine communications
that would be required for such acts to take place. Even in
relatively benign circumstances, these types of internal
processes are often exempted from disclosure.
For instance, under the Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”), government agencies must disclose all requested
agency records to any interested persons.213 However,
agencies can refuse to disclose records for national security
reasons, as well as for reasons “related solely to the internal
personnel rules and practices of an agency[,]”214 and “inter
agency or intraagency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency.”215 These exceptions
allow agencies within the executive branch to freely
communicate with one another, and carefully deliberate
decisions without fear that materials related to their
decisionmaking processes will become public and
politicized. Additionally, under the Administrative
Procedures Act (“APA”) rulemaking requirements,216
agencies are exempted from going through a public notice
and comment process when they make rules that are
related to military and foreign affairs functions217 or to
agency management or personnel.218
These exceptions are in place to enable the President to
perform core executive branch functions. These core
213. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
214. § 552(b)(2).
215. § 552(b)(5).
216. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
217. § 553(a)(1).
218. § 553(a)(2).
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functions involve, among other things, the enforcement of
laws, the carrying out of military and foreign affairs, and
the negotiation of international agreements. If the executive
branch could not control information related to these core
functions, it arguably could not perform the functions
efficiently or effectively.
Indeed, the underlying national security fear in
disclosing the type of information sought by ElMasri lies in
the potential for such disclosure to undermine the
effectiveness of executive branch operations, the safety of
government personnel and United States citizens, and the
ability of the government to maintain relationships with
foreign governments and other organizations. Furthermore,
other countries have strong self interest in United States
disclosure policies. In an article posted on the CIA’s public
website, Rutgers professor Warren F. Kimball explains that:
“It could jeopardize lives if agents or contacts were revealed;
it could jeopardize continued access to important
information if special relationships with foreign agencies
were acknowledged.”219 For instance, Kimball hypothesizes,
“if the United States had a ‘liaison’ relationship with the
government intelligence agency in a nation that had a
strong antiAmerican political element . . . [and] the United
States acknowledged that it received information from the
intelligence agency in [that country,]” the government of
that country “could fall.”220
The ElMasri case relies on a similar fear. The plaintiff
alleged, for example, that he was first detained by the
Macedonian government and then transferred to the
custody of CIA operatives.221 This suggests that the United
States and Macedonia may have engaged in some sort of
agreement either to detain the plaintiff or to hand him over
to the United States or both. Macedonia, which is formerly
part of Yugoslavia, has been trying to gain acceptance into
the European Union since 2004, hindered, in part, by a
disagreement with Greece over the right to use the name
219. Warren F. Kimball, Openness and CIA, STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE 63, 64
(WinterSpring 2001 No. 10), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/centerfor
thestudyofintelligence/csipublications/csistudies/studies/winter_spring01/
article08.pdf
220. Id.
221. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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“Macedonia.”222 Macedonia is, however, a member of the
Council of Europe, the wellrespected European
organization that stands separately from the European
Union, and which deals with human rights and democratic
principles.223 The Council of Europe recently published a
scathing review of the United States’ extraordinary
rendition program, stating, in part, that ElMasri’s claims
were highly credible.224
If the United States were to announce formally any
cooperation that Macedonia gave in such detentions, it
could hinder Macedonia’s political relationships within the
Council of Europe, and give the European Union additional
material to use in a decision to exclude Macedonia from
membership. Therefore, Macedonia is a stakeholder in the
decision to disclose or keep secret some of the information
required in the ElMasri case. Furthermore, if someone
within Macedonia cooperated without the formal consent of
the Macedonian government, then details about the
cooperation could expose that person or group to
Macedonian legal consequences. If we “out” those who
cooperate with us, we may dry up the flow of future
cooperators and alienate those persons with whom we have
already built or are cultivating relationships. ElMasri’s
claims also implicated cooperation between the United
States government and Afghanistan and Albania, as well as
cooperation between the United States government and
222. See, e.g., Lucy Moore, What’s in a Name? A Lot if You’re Macedonia,
PASSPORT (Feb. 29, 2008, 2:58 PM), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2008/02/
29/whats_in_a_name_a_lot_if_youre_macedonia (“Greek prime minister Costas
Karamanlis said today that his country will block Macedonia’s entrance into the
EU and NATO if the country does not change its name.”); see also Paul Lewis,
Compromise Likely to Take Macedonia Into U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1993, at
A8 (discussing Macedonia’s eventual acceptance into the United Nations after
compromising with Greece on its name); Candidate Countries: Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/
candidate_countries/fyrom/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) (listing
Macedonia as a candidate country for European Union membership).
223. 47 Countries, One Europe, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://www.coe.int/
aboutcoe/index.asp?page=47pays1europe&l=en (click “Display the list of
countries” hyperlink; then click “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
224. See COMM. ON LEGAL AFFAIRS & HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUR., CIA
ABOVE THE LAW? SECRET DETENTIONS AND UNLAWFUL INTERSTATE TRANSFERS OF
DETAINEES IN EUROPE 21831 (2008).
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private businesses who chartered the flights used to
transport ElMasri.225
Individual judges cannot be expected to have expertise
on the intricacies of foreign policy relationships, so they are
not in the best position to make decisions about whether
certain information should be kept secret. Rather, the
executive branch alone has the competency to make
decisions about foreign relationships and decide when
certain information must remain secret. Since judges make
decisions based on what is furnished by the executive
branch, mandatory judicial review does not, necessarily,
effectively check abuse. It does, however, increase the risk
of inappropriate dissemination of information and
jeopardize the future cooperation of foreign governments,
agents, and private businesses.
B. Case #2: Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.226
Five foreign nationals sued Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.
under the Alien Torts Statute.227 Jeppesen is a domestic
company based in California that provides logistical support
for aviation (i.e., flight planning).228 The plaintiffs, all
victims of extraordinary rendition, alleged that Jeppesen’s
participation in the program render it liable for damages.229
According to the plaintiffs, extraordinary renditions were
“carried out by the CIA, with the assistance of U.S.based
corporations, such as Jeppesen, who have provided the
aircraft, flight crews, and the flight and logistical support
necessary for hundreds of international flights.”230 Plaintiffs
allege that Jeppesen knew or should have known that
plaintiffs would be subject to “forced disappearance,
detention, and torture in countries where such practices are

225. See ElMasri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007).
226. 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).
227. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1129 (N.D.
Cal. 2008), rev’d, 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th
Cir. 2010).
228. See What We Do, JEPPESEN.COM, http://www.jeppesen.com/company/
about/whatwedo.jsp (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
229. Jeppesen Dataplan, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
230. Id.
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routine[,]”231
and
that
such
unlawful
detention,
interrogation, and torture occurred as a result of
defendants’ participation.232
The United States intervened in the case and moved to
assert the state secrets privilege to bar the disclosure of
certain information and therefore compel dismissal of the
case.233 The Northern District of California granted the
government’s motion to dismiss.234 The Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded, ordering the district court to
determine what evidence was privileged under Reynolds,
and dismissing the argument that the “very subject matter”
of the case barred it completely.235
The Ninth Circuit then granted a rehearing en banc,
and dismissed the suit entirely,236 holding:
This case requires us to address the difficult balance the state
secrets doctrine strikes between fundamental principles of our
liberty, including justice, transparency, accountability and
national security. Although as judges we strive to honor all of
these principles, there are times when exceptional circumstances
create an irreconcilable conflict between them. On those rare
occasions, we are bound to follow the Supreme Court's admonition
that ‘even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the
claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that [state]
secrets are at stake.’ After much deliberation, we reluctantly
conclude this is such a case, and the plaintiffs' action must be
dismissed.237

The Ninth Circuit differentiated claims of privilege that
bar the subject matter of the suit entirely under Totten, and
those which require a detailed evidentiary analysis under
Reynolds.238 Courts may dismiss cases requiring the
231. Id.
232. See id. at 113031.
233. Id. at 1132.
234. Id. at 1136.
235. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1003, 1009 (9th Cir.
2009).
236. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir.
2010).
237. Id. at 1073 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 11 (1953)).
238. Id. at 107783.
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disclosure of “clandestine spy relationships” or nuclear
weapons storage plans under Totten.239
The Ninth Circuit chose to avoid the difficult questions
about whether to extend the Totten bar here, because
Reynolds provided an alternate means of dismissal.240
Instead, the court reviewed classified documents submitted
by the government, and held that that the information
claimed to be privileged falls into one of four categories
claimed by the government:
[1] information that would tend to confirm or deny whether
Jeppesen or any other private entity assisted the CIA with
clandestine intelligence activities; [2] information about whether
any foreign government cooperated with the CIA in clandestine
intelligence activities; [3] information about the scope or operation
of the CIA terrorist detention and interrogation program; [or 4]
any other information concerning CIA clandestine intelligence
operations that would tend to reveal intelligence activities,
sources, or methods.241

The success of these four categories in persuading the
court to dismiss litigation supports the thesis that Article
III courts are in poor positions to override the executive
branch on matters relating to external conflicts. These
categories
involve
intelligence
activities,
foreign
partnerships and agreements, and sources and methods of
detention and intelligencegathering operations.
The inability to challenge the executive branch on these
matters rests, in part, on the court’s heavy reliance on the
executive branch to furnish the information used in the
decision. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit explained that it relied
“heavily” on classified submissions of the government to
reach its conclusion.242 Even after accepting the assumption
that Mohamed’s case could progress without depending on
privileged evidence, the court held it still must dismiss the
case because “there is no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen’s
239. Id. at 1084 (citing Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 910 (2005); Totten v. United
States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)).
240. Id. at 1085.
241. Id. at 1086 (quoting Redacted, Unclassified Brief for United States on
Reh’g En Banc at 78, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th
Cir. 2010) (No. 0815693)).
242. Id. at 1087.
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alleged liability without creating an unjustifiable risk of
divulging state secrets.”243
In this case, as in ElMasri, the state secrets at issue
were inextricably intertwined with any nonsecret
material.244 District courts are not competent, in cases like
this, to effectively “wall off” secret information during the
litigation progresses.245 Therefore, they must ban litigation
entirely.246
C. Jeppesen Dataplan’s Commentaries on ElMasri and the
Parameters of the State Secrets Privilege
After agreeing that this case mirrors the outcome of El
Masri, the Ninth Circuit made a point to note its
disagreement with the Fourth Circuit’s conflation of the
Totten bar and the Reynolds privilege.247 The court reasoned
that Totten bars cases because their “very subject matter”
deals with espionage, while Reynolds, may bar litigation if a
case present an “unacceptable risk of revealing state
secrets.”248 After differentiating these cases, the court stated
that Totten and Reynolds form a “continuum of analysis.”249
This hairsplitting differentiation indicates only that
espionage cases give a court a reason to dismiss a case
without any scrutiny, while other types of cases require
more scrutiny. Whether a court uses the Totten or Reynolds
analysis, however, the court will likely reach the same
243. Id. (emphasis omitted).
244. Id. at 1087, 108990.
245. See id. at 1089 (“Although district courts are well equipped to wall off
isolated secrets from disclosure, the challenge is exponentially greater in
exceptional cases like this one, where the relevant secrets are difficult or
impossible to isolate and even efforts to define a boundary between privileged
and unprivileged evidence would risk disclosure by implication. In these rare
circumstances, the risk of disclosure that further proceedings would create
cannot be averted through the use of devices such as protective orders or
restrictions on testimony.”).
246. See id.
247. Id. at 1087 n.12.
248. Id.
249. Id. (quoting AlHaramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190,
1201 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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conclusion. The latter just requires more work and
justification.
This careful discussion about the lengths to which
courts much go (or must not go) in assessing the validity of
a state secrets claim, provides insight into the limitations of
the courts in state secrets cases. The court in this case
reviewed classified government briefs about the information
sought to be protected. Despite its insistence on “close and
skeptical scrutiny of the record and the government’s case
for secrecy and dismissal[,]” the court still had to rely
heavily
on
the
government’s
disclosure
and
representations.250 It is, therefore, impossible in this
situation for the court to make a truly independent
judgment of the merits of the claim of secrecy. Instead, the
court is required to trust the executive branch’s disclosures.
So, although the court goes through the motions, it would
have a difficult time finding a basis on which to disagree
with the government’s assertion of the privilege.
The Ninth Circuit, after acknowledging its handicap in
such cases, suggested that other branches of government
may share in the responsibility to provide justice.251 Indeed,
the court made a plea to the executive and legislative
branches to consider remedial actions where appropriate:
First, that the judicial branch may have deferred to the executive
branch’s claim of privilege in the interest of national security does
not preclude the government from honoring the fundamental
principles of justice. The government, having access to the secret
information, can determine whether plaintiffs’ claims have merit
and whether misjudgments or mistakes were made that violated
plaintiffs’ human rights. Should that be the case, the government
may be able to find ways to remedy such alleged harms while still
maintaining the secrecy national security demands . . . .
Second, Congress has the authority to investigate alleged
wrongdoing and restrain excesses by the executive branch . . . .
Third, Congress also has the power to enact private bills . . . .
When national security interests deny alleged victims of wrongful
governmental action meaningful access to a judicial forum,
private bills may be an appropriate alternative remedy.252
250. Id. at 109293.
251. Id. at 109192.
252. Id.
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Fourth, Congress has the authority to enact remedial legislation
authorizing appropriate causes of action and procedures to
address claims like those presented here. When the state secrets
doctrine ‘compels the subordination of appellants’ interest in the
pursuit of their claims to the executive’s duty to preserve our
national security, this means that remedies for . . . violations that
cannot be proven under existing legal standards, if there are to be
such remedies, must be provided by Congress. That is where the
government’s power to remedy wrongs is ultimately reposed.’253

These suggestions indicate that the Ninth Circuit
believes Congress and the executive may share some
aspects of controlling fallout from the state secrets privilege.
The Ninth Circuit indicated that the executive may
independently and privately redress any wrong it has
committed. Alternatively, Congress may provide a remedy
at law to the plaintiffs or may check the executive branch’s
use of the privilege through investigative proceedings.
In its fourth suggestion, the Ninth Circuit quoted
Halkin v. Helms, a state secrets case involving Vietnamera
wiretapping and other surveillance.254 Hawkins stated that
“the Constitution compels the subordination of appellants'
interest in the pursuit of their claims to the executive's duty
to preserve our national security . . . .”255 The Ninth Circuit,
in Jeppesen Dataplan, altered the language to state that
“the state secrets doctrine compels the subordination of
appellants’ interest in the pursuit of their claims to the
executive’s duty to preserve our national security.”256
This change, in the context of the public internal debate
over the roots of the privilege, signifies a willingness on the
part of the Ninth Circuit to entertain the idea that Congress
may have authority to define allowable uses of the privilege.
The court did not, however, go so far as to state directly that
Congress has the authority to enact legislation requiring
the executive branch to disclose secret information. It
merely reasoned that Congress has the power to create new

253. Id. at 1092 (quoting Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 1001 (D.C. Cir.
1982)).
254. Halkin, 690 F.2d at 977.
255. Id. at 1001 (emphasis added).
256. Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1092 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
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legal standards that enable courts to redress new categories
of wrongs.
D. Case #3: Arar v. Ashcroft257
The Second Circuit released its en banc opinion in
November 2009, after three years of litigation.258 In his
complaint, Arar claims he was
detained while changing planes at Kennedy Airport in New York
(based on a warning from Canadian authorities that he was a
member of Al Qaeda), mistreated for twelve days while in United
States custody, and then removed to Syria via Jordan pursuant to
an intergovernmental understanding that he would be detained
and interrogated under torture by Syrian officials.259

He sued the Attorney General, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”), and “others, including senior
immigration officials”260 pursuant to the Torture Victims
Protection Act (“TVPA”) alleging substantive due process
rights violations related to “the conditions of his detention
in the United States, the denial of his access to counsel and
to the courts while in the United States, and his detention
and torture in Syria.”261 After more than a year in Syria, the
Canadian Embassy contacted Syria to determine Arar’s
whereabouts.262 He was visited by Canadian consular
officials, to whom he alleged that he had been tortured.263
After signing a confession admitting to being trained in a
terrorist training camp, Arar was released to Canada.264
The Canadian Broadcasting Company (“CBC”) reported
that the Canadian government’s judicial inquiry into the
case concluded that “Arar had no links to terrorist
organizations or militants. [The judge] also concluded the
257. 585 F.3d 559, 559 (2d. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
258. Id.
259. Id at 563.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 566.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 56667.
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[Royal Canadian Mounted Police] had given misleading
information to U.S. authorities, which may have been the
reason he was sent to Syria.”265 This led the Ottawa
government to reach a $10 million settlement with Arar.266
Arar sued the United States under a theory of Bivens
liability.267 The Court held that the Bivenstype remedy was
not allowable because “special factors” necessitate
hesitation on the part of the court when determining
liability.268 “The extraordinary rendition context involves
exchanges among the ministries and agencies of foreign
countries on diplomatic, security, and intelligence issues.
The sensitivities of such classified material are ‘too obvious
to call for enlarged discussion.’”269 The court reasoned that
“[e]ven the probing of these matters entails the risk that
other countries will become less willing to cooperate with
the United States in sharing intelligence resources to
counter terrorism.”270 Indeed, further probing would require
the court “to consider what was done by the national
security apparatus of at least three foreign countries, as
well as that of the United States.”271 Canada, which remains
one of the three foreign countries allegedly involved, has
“asserted the need for Canada itself to maintain the
confidentiality of certain classified materials related to

265. Ottawa Reaches $10M Settlement with Arar, CBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2007),
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/01/25/ararharper.html.
266. Id.
267. Arar, 585 F.3d at 563 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). The court reasoned that “[t]o
decide the Bivens issue, we must determine whether Arar’s claims invoke
Bivens in a new context; and, if so, whether an alternative remedial scheme was
available to Arar, or whether (in the absence of affirmative action by Congress)
‘special factors counsel[] hesitation.’ This opinion holds that ‘extraordinary
rendition’ is a context new to Bivens claims, but avoids any categorical ruling on
alternative remedies—because the dominant holding of this opinion is that, in
the context of extraordinary rendition, hesitation is warranted by special
factors.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
268. Id. at 565.
269. Id. at 576 (quoting Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988)).
270. Id.
271. Id.
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Arar’s claims” despite its payout of settlement money to
Arar.272
The courts in Arar, ElMasri, and Jeppesen Dataplan all
indicated a willingness to dismiss extraordinary rendition
lawsuits—all stating gravely serious claims—on executive
branch arguments that disclosure of information would
jeopardize relationships between the United States and
foreign governments or other organizations, would expose
sources and methods of intelligencegathering, and would
reveal the names of cooperators. The Ninth Circuit in
Jeppesen Dataplan remains the only circuit court to reverse
a district court decision on state secrets grounds in an
extraordinary rendition case; and, the Ninth Circuit has
allowed an en banc hearing to reconsider that decision.
This behavior by the courts suggests that the judiciary
may not believe they have the competence to stand against
the executive branch on a national security claim. Although
the judiciary can make a somewhat informed decision by
considering the confidential submissions required from the
government,273 the executive agency is only presenting its
side of the story and has an incentive to make its case as
strongly as possible. Therefore, it remains unlikely the
judge has all the necessary contextual information required
to make a determination of the likelihood or extent of harm
that could be caused by disclosure.
Additionally, exploration of these cases would
undoubtedly put the policies behind United States foreign
relationships, intelligence gathering, and law enforcement
on trial. The judiciary tends to avoid uncomfortable
separation of powers issues by arguing that it must avoid
policymaking. Furthermore, the realms of foreign policy
and United States relationshipbuilding rely on the
constitutional authority of the executive branch. Therefore,
the judiciary may lack the authority, in this specific context,
272. Id. (citing Ottawa Trying to Hold Back Documents from Arar Inquiry,
CBC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2004), http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2004/04/29/
arar040429.html).
273. According to United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1952), the
government must submit a document explaining in detail the information
sought to be protected. See supra Part I.B. In Arar, ElMasri, and Jeppesen
Dataplan, the government submitted a confidential document to the judge and a
nonconfidential summary to the opposing party.
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to require the disclosure of documents. Cases like Nixon,274
which deal only with domestic legal issues, leave the
judiciary more room to make demands on the executive.
IV. SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY
The executive branch’s national security justification
presumes that the government has a primary responsibility
to protect the citizenry from whatever ills may come from
the disclosure of information. The arguments for secrecy—
maintenance and promotion of cooperative relationships
with foreign governments and businesses and the protection
of vulnerable internal government processes—play on the
idea that secrecy protects democracy.
Some commentators, however, imply that secret
keeping may be antithetical to democratic processes. For
example, an unsigned 1972 Harvard Law Review article
claims that secrecy has “important implications for the
functioning of our democratic system of government—a
political system which presupposes the existence of a
knowledgeable electorate and Congress.”275 The article
argues that effective democracy relies on disclosure, not
secrecy. For instance, the article argues that “[t]he political
controversy over the Vietnam war has raised the question of
whether the public and Congress receive enough
information about defense and foreign policy matters to be
able to influence policy decisions and to exercise an effective
external check on the power of the executive.”276 The article
expresses no doubt, however, of the “constitutional
necessity” for certain executive secrets, the disclosure of
which would “unduly interfere with the functioning of the
executive branch.”277
With these constitutional concerns in mind, the article
argues that the separation of powers doctrine “does not
require, and may indeed preclude, any deference to the
executive which goes beyond permitting the executive to
protect specific types of information where disclosure would
274. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
275. Developments in the Law: The National Security Interest and Civil
Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1190 (1972).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1218.
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unduly interfere with the performance of its duties.”278
These duties include, specifically, the prevention of
“disclosures that could deter free debate within the
executive branch or could provide sensitive information to
an enemy.”279 The extraordinary rendition cases, according
to the courts, present this very type of information.280
Indeed, courts will insist on protections from disclosures of
methods and sources of intelligence, internal agency
personnel decisions, and secret agreements and contracts
with other governments, persons and entities.281
New York University professor J.H.H. Weiler argues
that the legitimacy of law relies on democracy by stating
that “obedience [of citizens] to the law . . . can neither be
claimed, nor justified, if the laws in question did not
emanate from a legal system embedded in some form of
democracy.”282 Seattle University law professor Mark A.
Chinen discusses Weiler’s claim by asking whether the idea
of secrecy is inherently democratic or undemocratic,
concluding that secrecy may in some cases aid democracy,
but that the argument for justifying certain intelligence
secrets is “untenable.”283 On one hand, “secrecy can be
inimical to democracy both as a means of achieving
meaningful consent and as a process through which a polity
makes community decisions.”284 On the other hand, there
are several reasons why secrecy may aid democracy. “First,
. . . secrecy can be used to combat coercion. Oppressed
groups often need secrecy to strengthen group cohesion and
to allow for mobilization for action. The very act of forming
democratic constitutions has required secrecy.”285 Also, “if
278. Id. at 1219.
279. Id.
280. See. e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2010); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
3409 (2010); ElMasri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
281. See generally Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1070; Arar, 585 F.3d at 559;
ElMasri, 479 F.3d at 296.
282. J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law: Governance, Democracy
and Legitimacy, 64 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 547, 547 (2004).
283. Mark A. Chinen, Secrecy and Democratic Decisions, 27 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 1, 34, 5253 (2009).
284. Id. at 8.
285. Id. at 89.
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meaningful consent depends on a government providing its
citizenry with accurate assessments of states of the world,
what happens if the flow of information needed for such
accuracy dries up because the sources and methods
enabling that flow are disclosed and thereby evaded?”286
The author then explains that “democracy requires
publicity to hold leaders accountable for their policy
decisions, yet ‘some policies and processes, if they were
made public, could not be carried out as effectively or at
all.’”287 After discussing secrecy in general, the article
entertains an analysis of reasons behind national security
secrecy, including what Richard Posner calls the
“embarrassment factor”—“that intelligence gathering, if
disclosed, will jeopardize foreign relations.”288 Also,
intelligence information is vulnerable to countermeasures, if
known.289
In his conclusion, the author argues that “it is entirely
appropriate to subject the argument for secrecy to very high
scrutiny when our representatives consider decisions of
national moment, or when the judiciary is being asked to
determine whether government is obeying the law.”290
However, the outcome of the secrecy debate “depends on
whether citizens wish to enter the debate in the first
place.”291 We have builtin processes in this country, like the
electoral process and the constitutional amendment process,
which
allow
citizens
to
rearrange
government
representatives or institute changes in government powers.
However, if citizens do not engage in such collective action
for change, it is possible that we can infer that (a) the
citizenry does not desire to make such a change292 or (b) our
democratic institutions have failed.

286. Id. at 9.
287. Id. at 10 (quoting Dennis F. Thompson, Democratic Secrecy, 114 POL. SCI.
Q. 181, 182 (1991)).
288. Id. at 14.
289. Id. at 14, 17.
290. Id. at 53.
291. Id.
292. For a detailed discussion of citizen engagement driving in substantial
government changes, see generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE (1993).
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A careful reading of the extraordinary rendition cases
reveal that courts have accepted the executive branch
argument that the secrets kept were of the type that could
cause embarrassment to our foreign and business
cooperators, and would leave the executive branch processes
vulnerable to countermeasures. The three articles on
democracy discussed above imply that these concerns, while
legitimate on their face, would lose legitimacy in the face of
blatant opposition from the citizenry, but may gain
legitimacy if the citizenry does not rise up in arms to
demand a change.
At this time in the United States, the citizens have not
risen up in arms against purported executive abuses of the
privilege. Rather, the jockeying between the congressional
and executive branches appears to be an internal tactical
struggle over the rights to power and control. The
electorate, for its part, did recently elect President Obama,
who promised he would reign in the privilege. To carry
through with that promise, President Obama created a new
policy to safeguard abuses by funneling all state secret
claims through the Department of Justice for approval.293
This policy arguably responded adequately to demands
from the citizenry. Although it is not the only possible
response, and may not be the quickest response, the
political process remains one of our strongest safeguards
against abuse. Even if the citizenry did rise up in arms
against the policy of a particular executive, this disapproval
would not create a right for Congress to take the reigns and
rewrite the policy. Rather, it may create momentum for a
changing of the guard.
The state secrets privilege, especially as it relates to
conflicts in the foreign policy arena, interplays with the core
functions of the executive branch. As it stands, the
executive defines and controls the state secrets privilege.
The judiciary assesses the application of that privilege.
Based on recent political events in the United States, it does
not appear that the current approach taken by the
judiciary—to give extreme deference to the executive in
protecting information that may create external conflicts—
runs counter to the needs or desires of the citizenry.
Democracy is a constant balance between the rights of the
293. See supra notes 5153 and accompanying text.
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many and of the few. In some cases, as here, the rights of
the many will overcome the rights of the few. The judiciary
remains best poised to weigh those rights without being
constrained by bright line rules that fail to account for the
nuances necessary to provide national protection while
preventing blatant abuse.
CONCLUSION
Although it was hoped that such matters would never
need to be discussed in this country, when such discussion
arises we must apply a flexible rule of law and entrust the
application of that law to the branch of government with the
least incentive to skew its position for political or personal
gain. The judiciary remains the branch most likely to
interpret the privilege in a way that considers the
separation of powers and national security concerns, while
respecting the individual rights articulated in the
Constitution. The judiciary does not drastically change its
views based on election cycles; therefore, it has the unique
capability to maintain consistency in interpretation and
application of the law. Furthermore, the judicial branch
approach does not create a power imbalance. Both the
congressional and executive approaches will necessitate an
extreme response from the opposing side and escalate the
internal conflict surrounding the privilege.
The congressional approach, which mandates judicial
review of all secret information, risks unnecessary
disclosure, erects unnecessary barriers (e.g., requiring all
attorneys to carry appropriate security clearances), and
creates closeddoor court proceedings which undercut the
transparency necessary to ensure neutral decision making.
This approach is especially inappropriate for cases which
involve external foreign stakeholders, because Congress
lacks the authority to substantively govern these areas.
Therefore, the congressional view violates the separation of
powers doctrine by undercutting core functions of the
executive branch.
The executive argument for absolute control of the
privilege leaves room for abuse and creates an unchecked
imbalance of power. However, unlike the extreme imbalance
posed by the congressional approach, the executive
approach carries only a slight imbalance. It can be remedied
by the subtle hand of the judiciary, but would be far
overcompensated by the blind pounding fist of Congress. In
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cases involving external conflicts, the executive claim
becomes even stronger, requiring the greatest possible
deference by the judiciary. Only in rare circumstances
would the judiciary need to intervene.
As the extraordinary rendition cases reveal, a judge’s
ability to analyze a state secrets claim remains limited
because a judge does not have the time, access, or
competency to look at all relevant information in context.
First, even if the executive branch turns over all directly
relevant information, the judge may not have access to the
tangentially relevant information necessary to make a fully
informed decision. Since the executive branch decides what
information to turn over, a judge may not know he or she is
missing key information. Second, the full scope of
information necessary to make decisions may be too
voluminous to review in detail. Third, even if a judge has
access to all necessary information, the judge must view
that information outside of the context of the programs and
processes the information was created to support or protect.
With respect to requiring the disclosure of information
related to United States foreign relations, intelligence
sources and methods, and the safety and security of United
States personnel and cooperators, the federal courts are
hamstrung by their inability to consider the entire context
of executive decision making.
An analysis of both internal and external conflict
situations supports the position that the executive branch is
the only branch with the capability and competency to make
appropriate decisions with respect to this type of
information security. However, the judiciary has a limited
responsibility to check executive abuses of this privilege by
reviewing the type of information sought to be protected,
and, on a casebycase basis, specific and limited
information if necessary.
The judicial approach of giving deference to the
executive based on the type of information sought to be
protected and reviewing claims on a casebycase basis
remains the most appropriate approach to the privilege.
This approach has the capacity to ferret out some abuses,
while respecting the separation of powers doctrine and
considering national security concerns. For these reasons,
and considering the incentives for both the executive and
the legislature to take extreme viewpoints in order to isolate
control of the privilege, the judiciary remains the best
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suited to provide a subtle check on the executive branch as
the executive branch defines and controls the privilege.

